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IN SEARCH OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES:
THE NASCENT TREATY POWER AND THE
TURBULENT ORIGINS OF FEDERAL
TRADEMARK LAW
ZVI S. ROSEN'
For the past hundred and thirty years, the Supreme Court's
unanimous opinion in the Trade-Mark Cases'-which invalidated
the federal trademark laws enacted from 1870 through 1876 on
constitutional grounds-has stood as one of the few cases to
opine on the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause of the
United States Constitution.' The Court held that congressional
I Zvi S. Rosen is a member of the Bar of New York and can be contacted at
zvi@rosenweb.com. The author would like to thank, in no particular order, Maria
Bachman at the International Trademark Association, William Davis of the
National Archives, the regional branches of the National Archives in New York,
Philadelphia, and Chicago, the library at the State University of New York at
Albany, Agnes Mathisen, I. Walton Bader, the law libraries at the George
Washington University and Cumberland School of Law, Robert Brauneis and the
members of the fall 2008 IP History Seminar at George Washington, Chiawen Kiew,
David Orozco, and all others who contributed to this undertaking.
1 100 U.S. 82 (1879). The case is also referred to as Steffens v. United States. The
short, practical name "Trade-Mark Cases" was part of the trend towards shorter and
more useful case names begun during John William Wallace's tenure as Reporter of
Decisions. Preface to 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) xiii-xiv (1863). The trend stemmed from his
desire to prevent case names from becoming unwieldy since the case name "is only
designed for facility of reference." Id. Wallace's practice in this area and others stood
in stark contrast to the reporters who had preceded him, and his methodology was
largely criticized. MORRIS L. COHEN & SHARON HAMBY O'CONNOR, A GUIDE TO THE
EARLY REPORTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 110-12 (1995).
Many of Wallace's practices were followed by his successor William Tod Otto, who
served as reporter for this case. It is general custom to address the case as "the
Trade-Mark Cases." See John T. Cross, The Lingering Legacy of Trade-Mark Cases,
2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 367, 367 n.1 (2008). While the definite article "the" is not
part of the title, it is an indispensable way of regarding the decision, avoiding
confusion as to whether one is discussing cases regarding trademarks more
generally. As for the hyphenated form "Trade-Mark," the term seems to have
generally been hyphenated in that day or written as two words, unhyphenated.
2 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8
("[The Congress shall have Power To] promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."). The Clause is also "known variously as
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regulation of both interstate and intrastate trademarks was
impermissible on the grounds of both the Intellectual Property
Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. The generally accepted story of this case has been
fairly straightforward-this opinion, arising out of several
obscure criminal prosecutions, was a shock both to the nascent
trademark community and to the broader legal world. Taken
aback, Congress rushed into action a deeply inadequate
trademark law premised on the incorrect belief that the Supreme
Court had held that the Commerce Clause did not grant the
power to regulate interstate trademarks, and thus regulated only
trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations or the Indian
tribes.
This story is deeply flawed in two respects. Firstly, it fails to
consider the importance of the opinion of the Circuit Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Leidersdorf v. Flint4 a year
before, as well as other less-known cases. That decision received
national attention, not least because (the elder) Justice Harlan
concurred with the opinion in that case and touched off a
national debate among the scholars of the day about whether the
trademark laws were constitutional. The issue was perhaps the
most important for those concerned with trademark law in the
year prior to the decision, thus making the Supreme Court's
decision a less than total surprise.
More importantly, the standard history completely fails to
consider the importance of foreign treaty obligations to the
legislation before and after the Trade-Mark Cases. Attempts to
establish a federal trademark law for domestic reasons failed to
gain any traction in the years prior to the 1870 Act. By contrast,
the 1870 Act was a result of bills introduced specifically to call
into effect trademark treaties executed with foreign powers, and
it quickly became law.5 While it is reasonable to believe that a
constitutional justification was an oversight once the trademark
bills were folded into the then-pending omnibus IP act, it is likely
'the Patent Clause' or 'the Copyright Clause' depending upon one's perspective and
clientele." Anne H. Chasser, A Historical Perspective: The International Trademark
Association and the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 93 TRADEMARK
REP. 35, 38 (2003).
' See Trade-Mark Cases, 82 U.S. at 90.
" 15 F. Cas. 260 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1878) (No. 8,219), affd, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
' The 1870 Act was an omnibus act including copyright and patent revisions as
well, but the origins of the trademark sections arose in independent bills.
(Vol. 83:827
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that even beforehand, the constitutional rationale behind the
bills that led to the 1870 trademark laws was that the Congress
was simply calling into effect the treaties. The same rationale
was clearly on display during the lengthy deliberations over what
would become the 1881 Act-just like the 1870 Act, the 1881
legislation was enacted to call into effect the treaty obligations of
the United States regarding trademarks, not to create a domestic
trademark system.
The previous literature on trademark law in this era has
yielded some insight, but an in-depth look at the history and
meaning of the case and its milieu has not previously been done,
and documentation of the early history of American federal
trademark law is surprisingly sparse. Over one hundred years
after it was written, the richest secondary source on the early
history of the federal trademark law remains the report and
(especially) the dissenting opinion of the commissioners
authorized to study a modification of the nation's trademark and
patent laws, issued in 1902.6 While this report was written by
men who had been present for many of the events described in
this Article, it almost entirely limits its sources to the
Congressional Record and other official publications. The
seminal work on the history of American trademark law-
Schechter's The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to
Trade-Marks--does not even go into as much detail as is
presented in the report; it focuses more on even earlier history.7
In the past few years, although several other works have
explored history of trademark law in this era, they have had
other focuses and did not go significantly beyond the account in
the 1902 report.' While the decision and congressional
6 FRANCIS FORBES ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED To
REVISE THE STATUTES RELATING TO PATENTS, TRADE AND OTHER MARKS, AND
TRADE AND COMMERCIAL NAMES, S. Doc. No. 20 (2d Sess. 1902).
1 FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING
TO TRADE-MARKS (1925). In fact, Schechter mistakenly states that the 1876
Trademark Act was the replacement act, rather than the 1881 one. Id. at 140.
1 Professor Cross, for example, provides a close reading of the Court's decision
and was the first to seriously explore the role of the treaty power; his article focuses
on what would have happened if the case was decided differently. See Cross, supra
note 1, at 368. Professor Abdel-Khalik wrote an article primarily about scandalous
marks, but she nonetheless provides useful historical background by noting the bill
proposed in 1860. See Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To Live in In-"Fame"-y: Reconceiving
Scandalous Marks as Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
173, 181-82 (2007).
2009]
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publications are important sources, a broader investigation is
necessary to understand the early development of American
trademark law.
The question that I seek to answer in this research is what
exactly is the meaning of the Trade-Mark Cases in American
history? In search of the meaning of the Trade-Mark Cases and
the legislation that brackets it, questions far broader than the
procedural history of the cases came to the fore. This Article
delves into the first two decades of federal trademark law in
America, starting with the first trademark bill in 1860 and
proceeding to Congress's final reaction to the Supreme Court's
decision in 1882. The procedural history of the cases and several
other cases that examined the issue are also addressed, as well
as the scholarly responses to them. Finally, entering the modern
era, attempts to overrule the Trade-Mark Cases by constitutional
amendment, both immediately after the holding and as late as
1955, are examined.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES
The very first discussion of a federal trademark law was
surprisingly early-in 1791.1 A Boston sailmaker named George
Breck petitioned to be allowed to register his trademark with the
new federal government, and the matter was sent to the
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson.1 ° Jefferson produced a
report advocating that a trademark law be passed by the federal
government,11 but nothing came of it, and a trademark law would
9 Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH L.
REV. 29 (1910), reprinted in 62 TRADEMARK REP. 239, 251 (1972).
10 Id.
n THOMAS JEFFERSON, Report on the policy of securing particular marks to
Manufacturers, by Law, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 156, 156-57
(Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905). The report reads:
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred by the House of
Representatives the petition of Samuel Breck and others, proprietors of a
sail-cloth manufactory in Boston, praying that they may have the exclusive
privilege of using particular marks for designating the sail-cloth of their
manufactory, has had the same under consideration, and thereupon
Reports, That it would, in his opinion, contribute to fidelity in the
execution of manufacturers, to secure to every manufactory an exclusive
right to some mark on its wares, proper to itself.
That this should be done by general laws, extending equal right to every
case to which the authority of the legislature should be competent.
That these cases are of divided jurisdiction: Manufactures made and
consumed within a State being subject to State legislation, while those
[Vol. 83:827830
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not be contemplated by the federal government for nearly
seventy years.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the common law
tort of fraud and deceit developed into common law protection for
trademarks, and "ibly the 1850s, common law rules against
passing off and trademark infringement were well-accepted." 12
As the common law of trademarks began to coalesce, states also
began to enact statutes clarifying civil remedies, as well as
providing criminal remedies in some cases. In 1845, New York
was the first state to pass a trademark law, providing for both
criminal and civil remedies 13 but would hardly be the last; prior
to 1870, eleven other states would also enact statutes respecting
trademarks. 14
For many legislators, these common law and state statutory
protections for trademarks would be more than sufficient, while
others would feel that protection was needed on a federal level.
The argument that a federal statute was needed to protect
domestic trademark holders would prove insufficient though, and
only the need to execute treaties signed with foreign nations
regarding trademarks would there be sufficient support for a
federal trademark law.
which are exported to foreign nations, or to another State, or into the
Indian Territory, are alone within the legislation of the General
Government.
That it will, therefore, be reasonable for the General Government to
provide in this behalf by law for those cases of manufacture generally, and
those only which relate to commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
And that this may be done by permitting the owner of every manufactory,
to enter in the records of the court of the district wherein his manufactory
is, the name with which he chooses to mark or designate his wares, and
rendering it penal in others to put the same mark to any other wares.
Id.
12 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 5:2 (4th ed. 2009).
"s 1845 N.Y. Laws 304-05; Arthur W. Barber, The Constitution and Trade-
Marks, 5 LAw. & BANKER & BENCH & B. REv. 210, 211 (1912).
14 Forbes, supra note 6, at 91-92. The other states were Connecticut (1847);
Pennsylvania (1847); Massachussetts (1850); Ohio (1859); Iowa (1860); Michigan
(1863); Oregon (1864); Nevada (1865); Kansas (1866); Maine (1866); Missouri (1866).
Id. Of these laws, eight provided for criminal remedies, two provided for civil and
criminal remedies, and two provided civil remedies only. Id. Those states only
providing criminal remedies presumably meant to complement the civil common-law
trademark law.
2009]
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A. Early Lobbying and Failed Bills
While 1860 was a year fraught with tensions, it was also a
year of firsts for trademark law. Not only was the first American
trademark treatise published, 5 but the first federal trademark
bill was proposed. 16  On March 12, 1860, two representatives
from Pittsburgh announced their intent to introduce a trademark
bill,' 7 and two days later, one of them, Rep. James K. Moorhead,
did so; the bill was reported to the Committee on Commerce. 8
The bill was followed by petitions to both Houses: to the House, a
petition from citizens of Lowell, Massachusetts' 9 and from
citizens of St. Louis, Missouri;2 ° to both the House and the
Senate, a petition from citizens of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.2'
Rep. Moorhead, had a commercial background22 and would prove
himself the prime exponent of a federal trademark law through
the decade. His efforts would not be particularly successful.
The content of the bill was straightforward. "[Ainy person or
persons who shall knowingly and wilfully forge or counterfeit" a
mark with intent to pass it off as the product or mark of another
"shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be liable to
indictment therefor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
imprisoned for a period of not exceeding twelve months, and
fined not exceeding three thousand dollars."23  The same
punishment would be available for an individual in possession of
plates or molds, or otherwise in possession of illicitly marked
'5 See FRANcIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS (1860);
Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal Dilution Legislation,
82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 5, 6 (2000).
16 H.R. 330, 36th Cong. (1st Sess. 1860).
17 See 56 HOUSE J. 504 (Mar. 12, 1860).
18 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1147 (1860). Rep. Moorhead attempted to
introduce the bill the previous day but was rebuffed by the Speaker. Id. at 1131.
'" See 56 HOUSE J. 649 (Apr. 3, 1860) (introduced by Rep. Train). The writing on
the back of the petition states that House Bill 330 was related to this petition, but
the bill was introduced prior to the entry of this petition. See H.R. 330, 36th Cong.
(1860). A copy of this petition is on file with the author.
20 See 56 HOUSE J. 846 (May 16, 1860) (introduced by Rep. Barrett).
21 56 HOUSE J. 565 (Mar. 22, 1860) (introduced by Rep. Moorhead); 51 SEN. J.
375 (Apr. 10, 1860) (introduced by Sen. Cameron).
22 James Kennedy Moorhead, 2 MAG. W. HIST. 478, 478-90 (1885).
' H.R. 330, 36th Cong. § 1 (1st Sess. 1860). The punishments given were less
draconian in an earlier version of the bill at the National Archives, but since the
House Journals say the bill was reported back without amendment, it is assumed
that this earlier version and its changes date prior to the bill's introduction.
[Vol. 83:827
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goods for distribution.24 The bill was reported back to the House
on May 18, 1860, without amendments, 25 accompanied by a
report in favor of the measure. The report argued for a federal
trademark law but did not specify what constitutional provision
it should be based on, referring to both the "encouragement of
useful arts" and "just protection of trade" as being the duty of
Congress. 27  Nonetheless, it was implied that trademark
regulation was akin to patent regulation, and thus, the exercise
of congressional power would flow from the same clause of the
Constitution.28
Following the report, the bill was recommitted to the
Committee on the Whole House on the State of the Union. 29 It
would not be able to leave, as members of Congress would have
doubts regarding its constitutionality in the second session of the
Thirty-sixth Congress and refuse to allow a vote of the full
House. On January 31, 1861, Rep. Noell objected to the bill's
consideration, noting that he would "have no objection to it if the
General Government had any power over this subject."0 When
Rep. Moorhead made the same motion the following week, Rep.
Burnett made a similar objection, asserting that he could not
withdraw his objection on these grounds "until the form of our
Government is changed."31 As such, came and went the only
constitutionally based objections to federal trademark protection
in Congress. No one arose again until after the Trade-Mark
Cases.
The trademark bill would not be heard from again in the
Thirty-sixth Congress. Rep. Moorhead introduced a trademark
bill again in the Thirty-seventh Congress that was referred to the
Judiciary Committee, but it went nowhere and no copy
survives." From 1866 to 1867, Rep. Moorhead once again made
a concerted effort for a trademark act. Petitions once again
arrived from Rep. Moorhead's home city to both the House and
24 Id. § 2. The same comment also applies.
25 56 HOUSE J. 863 (May 18, 1860).
26 H.R. REP. No. 36-527, at 1 (1st Sess. 1860).
27 Id. at 2.
28 See id.
56 HOUSE J. 863 (May 16, 1860).
30 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 670 (1861).
31 Id. at 798.
32 H.R. 235, 37th Cong. (2d Sess. 1862); 59 HOUSE J. 207 (Jan. 20, 1862). No
copy of this bill exists in the National Archives or Library of Congress.
2009]
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the Senate,33 and shortly thereafter, a trademark bill was
proposed.34 The bill was referred to the Committee on Patents,
not printed, and not heard from again.
All of these bills were, so far as can be told from the record,
concerned primarily with protecting American trademarks
within the borders of the United States. The Lowell Petition is
explicit about this,3 and in all other congressional materials
relating to trademark reform until 1867, foreign marks were
never mentioned. The fact that Congress was uninterested in
these bills for both constitutional and normative reasons strongly
contrasts with the reception afforded to international trademark
treaties.
B. International Treaties
In the 1850s and 1860s, European nations began to pass
trademark laws.36 Belgium and Germany, among others, began
to tighten their policies on patents to exclude trademarks from
protection. In these years, the press in the U.S. also took
occasional notice of what were becoming increasingly frequent
international trademark disputes.3 By 1865, foreign nations
33 59 SEN. J. 121 (Jan. 21, 1867) (introduced by Sen. Cowan); 64 HOUSE J. 182
(Jan. 17, 1867). The handwritten petitions appear to be the same for the two bodies
and make a straightforward claim that they operated under a disadvantage due to
the lack of federal trademark protection. This is followed by a request that Congress
extend copyright law to encompass trademarks. 59 SEN. J. 121; 64 HOUSE J. 182.
The Senate petition was initially referred to the Committee on Patents and the
Patent Office, but it was moved to the Committee on Manufactures. 59 SEN. J. 121
(Jan. 31, 1867). There was also a petition the previous year from bottlers in the
District of Columbia for trademark protection, but it does not seem to have been
related. 58 SEN. J. 332 (Apr. 12, 1866) (introduced by Sen. Morril and referred to the
Committee on the District of Columbia) (all petitions on file with author). Either
way, a law limited to the District of Columbia would be free of the constitutional
constraints dealt with in the Trade-Mark Cases.
3- H.R. 1008, 39th Cong. (1st Sess. 1867); 64 HOUSE J. 197 (Jan. 17, 1867). No
copy of this bill exists in the National Archives or the Library of Congress.
35 Petition from the Citizens of Lowell, Mass., in Support of Bill 330 (Apr. 3,
1860) (on file with the author).
36 WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS 57-58
(1873).
37 See id. at 21.
3 Paul DuGuid, French Connections: The International Propagation of
Trademarks in the Nineteenth Century, 10 ENTERPRISE & SOcY 1, 13-14 (2009)
(discussing American opinion in an article on the development of French trademark
law).
[Vol. 83:827
IN SEARCH OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES
were inquiring about the status of trademark law in the U.S.;39 it
would not be long before this curiosity morphed into negotiation.
The first trademark treaty was signed with Russia in 1868,40
followed shortly thereafter by treaties with Belgium4' and
France.42 With each of these treaties, a question would linger as
to whether they were self-executing or whether their enactment
required affirmative legislation by congress.
In September 1867, the U.S. expressed interest in a
trademark treaty with Russia, and Russia indicated its
willingness to do so in late 1867, proposing that it be drawn
along the lines of article 22 of its Treaty of Commerce with
France.43 The treaty was negotiated during January 1868 in
Washington, D.C.44 and signed on January 27. 45  It was
transmitted to the Senate on the following day,46 and ratification
was advised that summer.47 The treaty read, in pertinent part:
The High Contracting Parties, desiring to secure complete and
efficient protection to the manufacturing industry of their
respective citizens and subjects, agree that any counterfeiting in
one of the two countries of the trade marks affixed in the other
on merchandize to show its origin and quality, shall be strictly
prohibited and repressed, and shall give ground for an action of
damages in favor of the injured party, to be prosecuted in the
courts of the country in which the counterfeit shall be proven.
The trade marks in which the citizens or subjects of one of the
two countries may wish to secure the right of property in the
other, must be lodged exclusively, to wit, the marks of citizens
39 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 352 (1865) (responding to a letter from the Austrian
Minister inquiring about trademark protections in the United States).
40 Additional Article to Treaty of Commerce, 1832. Trade-Marks., U.S.-Russ.,
Jan. 27, 1868, reprinted in 2 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS,
PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS
1524 (William H. Malloy ed. 1910) [hereinafter MALLOY].
41 Additional Article to Treaty of July 17, 1858, Concerning Trade-Marks, U.S.-
Belg., Dec. 20, 1868, reprinted in 1 MALLOY, supra note 40, at 86.
42 Trade-Mark Convention, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 16, 1869, reprinted in 1 MALLOY,
supra note 40, at 534. It has been argued that the French treaty was the most
important in spurring the drafting of the 1870 Act. Duguid, supra note 38, at 28-29.
43 Letter from the Chancellor of the Empire of Russ. to the U.S. to William
Seward, Sec'y of State (Dec. 1, 1867) (on file with Dept. of State Papers, Nat'l
Archives, College Park, Md.).
Message of the President for the Third Session of the 40th Congress, 65
HOUSE J. 39 (Dec. 10, 1868).
45 16 SEN. EXEC. J. 157 (1868).
4 Id.
47 Id. at 371-72.
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of the United States, in the Department of Manufactures and
Inland Commerce, at St. Petersburg, and the marks of Russian
subjects, at the Patent Office in Washington.48
This treaty's provisions created, for the first time, a registry at
the Patent Office (then in the Department of the Interior) for
trademarks.4 9 They also created a civil cause of action for
damages, although whether injunctive relief would likewise be
permitted is less clear.50
The next trademark treaty was with Belgium, later in 1868.
Following up on an "intimation" from the minister to Belgium,
the Secretary of State authorized him to conclude a trademark
convention along the lines of the one concluded with Russia.51
The Belgian government objected to the phrase "and repressed"
in the Russian treaty, feeling that it suggested criminal
jurisdiction and also insisted on additional language about marks
in the public domain.52 Aside from these changes, the treaty was
substantially identical to the Russian treaty in verbiage and was
advised on by the Senate in much shorter order than the Russian
treaty.53
With these two treaties signed and ratified, the ball began
rolling for treaties with major commercial powers; France was
the first. The Emperor, Napoleon III, noted the trademark
treaties in his 1869 address and specifically asserted that France
was prepared for such an arrangement.54 Such an arrangement
was concluded April 16, 1869, and ratified in short order.55 In
48 Additional Article to Treaty of Commerce, 1832. Trade-Marks., U.S.-Russ.,
Jan. 27, 1868, reprinted in 2 MALLOY, supra note 40, at 1524.
49 Id.
5 Id.
," Letter from William Seward, Sec'y of State, to Henry Sanford, Ambassador to
Belg. (Nov. 17, 1868) (on file with author).
52 Letter from Henry Sanford, Ambassador to Belg. to William Seward, Sec'y of
State (Dec. 20, 1868) (on file with author). This letter also transmitted the proposed
treaty and noted that the problem was mostly of American trademarks being
infringed in Belgium. Belgium also wanted protections for designs and models,
where the situation was the reverse, but the ambassador did not feel that his
instructions from the Secretary of State included such authorization. Letter from the
Belgian Dept. of Interior to Henry Sanford, Ambassador to Belg. (Dec. 11, 1868);
Letter from Henry Sanford, Ambassador to Belg. to William Seward, Sec'y of State.
53 16 SEN. ExEc. J. 463-64 (1869).
4 Napoleon III, Report on the Conditions of the Empire, for 1869, made to the
Senate and Legislative Assembly of France (1869) (translation on file with state
department). The handwritten translation in the State Department papers says this
alludes specifically to the treaty with Russia.
5 17 SEN. ExEc. J. 219 (1869).
[Vol. 83:827
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substance, it was similar to the Belgian treaty-save that it fixed
that this arrangement was limited by the duration normally
given to trademarks in the relevant country. Other treaties
would be made throughout the 1870s and beyond, but a question
quickly reared its head-need domestic legislation be passed in
America as a result of these treaties?
That treaties are the "supreme Law of the Land," on par
with statutes, is set forth in the Constitution.56 Arising out of the
Louisiana Purchase and annexation of Florida, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Foster v. Neilson5 7 was the definitive word at
the time regarding whether a treaty is self-executing. In
pertinent part, it said:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a
legislative act. It does not generally effect of itself the object to
be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-
territorial, but is carried into execution by the sovereign power
of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is
consequently to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to
an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without
the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages
to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.5"
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 103, 109-10 (1801). To wit:
The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme
law of the land. Of consequence its obligation on the courts of the United
States must be admitted. It is certainly true that the execution of a
contract between nations is to be demanded from, and, in the general,
superintended by the executive of each nation, and therefore, whatever the
decision of this court may be relative to the rights of parties litigating
before it, the claim upon the nation is unsatisfied, may still be asserted.
But yet where a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the rights
of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is
as much to be regarded by the court as an act of congress.
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 109-10.
51 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
58 Id. at 254.
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Over forty years after the decision in Foster, it was still one of the
few pronouncements on this issue.59 All of the trademark
treaties specifically gave a cause of action in the courts of each
nation, and thus, were most likely self-executing. Even if causes
of action had not been specifically mentioned in the treaties, the
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a treaty could
provide jurisdiction for a cause of action when a treaty did not
specifically create a cause of action, leading to the possible
inference that such a treaty need not specifically enact a cause of
action to be self-executing. 6° Nonetheless, it would only be
prudent to put legislation in Congress, both to ensure the
execution of the treaties and to put greater detail into the
procedure of their enforcement.
This leads to the second question: Under what authority
could Congress pass executory legislation generally? In the 1920
case Missouri v. Holland,6' the Supreme Court held that the
making of a treaty gave Congress the power to enforce its
provisions even if Congress would otherwise lack the power to
enact the legislation. 62  However, that case was still a half-
century away in 1870, and it is unclear to what degree such a
power was recognized at the time. The primary tension with
such a power is the Tenth Amendment, with its reservation of
powers not enumerated to the states.63 Some have argued that
until Missouri v. Holland, the treaty power only permitted
Congress to legislate up to the limits of its enumerated powers.64
Others have argued that the treaty power extended further at
the time and permitted Congress to act even in areas where such
action would otherwise be prohibited.65 While arguments for
both sides are compelling, it does not seem that Congress or the
courts took the latter, "nationalist," view of the treaty power in
1870. 1880 would be less clear.
" Leslie Henry, When is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MICH. L. REV. 776, 777
(1929).
60 United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 43 (1852).
61 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
62 Id. at 432-35.
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
6 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 390, 419-22 (1998).
' See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1075, 1239-44 (2000).
[Vol. 83:827
IN SEARCH OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES
C. The 1870 Act
While no record survives, it seems that trademarks were
deposited in the Patent Office under these treaties even prior to
any formal enactment executing these treaties.66 This gave the
matter a certain urgency, and, apropos of these treaties, two
separate bills were introduced as Senate Bills 264 and 265 on
April 7, 1869.67 The former bill assumed that the civil remedies
of the Russian treaty were self-executing and provided criminal
remedies for the infringement of Russian trademarks.68 The
latter bill, by contrast, was proposed simply to execute the
treaties that had just been concluded; specifically, it was
proposed to "carry into effect the stipulations" of trademark
treaties more generally.69 The bills were referred to different
committees, and both were referred back and debated on the
same day, two weeks later.7 ° On that day, Senator Trumbull
noted that the introduction of both bills had been a mistake and
asked that his bill (Senate Bill 264) be withdrawn in favor of
Senate Bill 265.71 There was some debate over whether the bill
added anything to the law, and Senator Sumner said that the
purpose of the bill was simply to effectuate the three treaties
already signed. 2 Without much more debate, the bill was passed
by the Senate.73 Concurrence was requested from the House, 4
but the House did not take a straightforward approach in
concurring with this bill.
6 See Letter from Mr. J.E.W. Bowen, Exam'r of Trademarks, to Rep. N.J.
Hammond, Member of the House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 1880) [hereinafter
Bowen Letter] (on file with the House Committee on the Judiciary in the National
Archives). Apparently they were not registered, and no record was kept-this was
simply his recollection. See id.
67 See 63 SEN. J. 133 (Apr. 7, 1869).
68 See S. 264, 41st Cong. (1st Sess. 1869).
69 S. 265, 41st Cong. (1st Sess. 1869). Indeed, the treaty would be sent to the
Senate by the President a week later and consented to three days after that. 17 SEN.
EXEC. J. 219 (1869); 17 SEN. EXEC. J. 196 (1869).
70 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2894 (1869). Senate Bill 264 was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, while Senate Bill 265 was referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations. See 63 SEN. J. 133 (Apr. 7, 1869).
71 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2894.
72 Id. The argument in the contrary was simply that foreigners could already sue
in the federal courts to enforce their common law trademark rights. See id. at 2894-
95.
73 See id. at 2895.
' See id. at 2932.
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Less than a year later, in the second session of the Forty-
first Congress, a slew of bills would be introduced on the subject
of foreign trademarks. The first was introduced by Senator
Trumbull (who had also introduced Senate Report 264) as Senate
Report 501 on February 7, 1870 and referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary.7 Entitled "A Bill [miore effectually to provide
for the execution of treaties for the protection of the owners of
trade marks," it would effectuate trademark treaties by granting
the circuit courts jurisdiction to hear cases under trademark
treaties.76 The second was introduced in the House as House
Bill 1824 on April 19, 1870, and doubled the tariff on imported
goods bearing a false trademark of American goods. 7 The final
one was fairly limited, introduced two days later, and dealt solely
with imported watches.7v
This myriad of bills from the second session were ultimately
distractions. Rather than taking a simple position on concurring
with the Senate Bill, the House took a much more ambitious
approach and combined the trademark bill with the full revision
of the nation's intellectual property laws then occupying the
Committee on Patents. 79 House Bill 1714 started out as a patent
revision and then had copyrights added to it.80  As it came
towards completion, trademarks would be added as well.8 '
Representative Thomas B. Jenckes first brought up this
development to the whole Congress on April 14, 1870, in a
lengthy explanation of the omnibus bill. The trademark bill
received limited mention; he noted that it simply provided an
75 See 64 SEN. J. 209 (Feb. 7, 1870).
76 S. 501, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1869).
71 See H.R. 1824, 41st Cong. (1870); 69 HOUSE J. 640 (Dec. 6, 1869).
78 See S. 829, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870); 64 SEN. J. 529 (Apr. 21, 1870). This bill
was sent to the Committee on Finance and reported with minor amendments a week
later. 64 SEN. J. 566 (Apr. 28, 1870). Apparently this bill was meant to address the
specific problem of foreign counterfeiting of American watches, which were then
imported to the U.S. and sold at lower prices. See A Needed "Protection," CHI. TRIB.,
June 14, 1870, at 2; see also Editorial, N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 29, 1870, at 4 (noting that
watch importers had threatened to spend a large sum of money to defeat the bill).
" See H.R. 1714, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870). The history of the bill more
generally can be found at WILLIAM F. PATRY, 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:33 (2009).
80 See PATRY, supra note 79.
81 Id. Unfortunately, there is no documentation of when trademarks were added
to the bill or the motivation for including them in the omnibus bill-what evidence
there is of the committee's deliberations does not include such detail.
[Vol. 83:827
IN SEARCH OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES
alternative to state protection and did not go beyond the contours
of common law trademark protection.82 He then explained the
reasons for introducing a federal trademark law at that time:
Concerning trade-marks, we are at present in an anomalous
condition, which perhaps is not understood by the House
generally. By certain treaties or conventions with Belgium,
France, and Russia, we have agreed to recognize the validity of
the trade-marks of those countries upon their being registered
in the Patent Office of the United States, and to give them the
same effect throughout the United States that they have in the
country where they originated; and trade-marks recognized by
the law of this country have the same effect throughout those
European countries as the trademarks secured by the citizens
or subjects of those countries. Thus by treaties, which are a
part of the supreme law of the land, we have secured to subjects
of those three nations rights which are not by national law
secured to citizens of the United States. The right, which it is
proposed to protect by registration of trademarks are not
greater in any sense than those which are secured to citizens of
foreign countries. In fact, these provisions are substantially
those of the continental nations, and also those of the trade-
marks statute of Great Britain, with which country I believe we
are also engaged in negotiations for a similar treaty. The
desirableness of these provisions I have not heard questioned by
any one.83
Although discussion of technical aspects of the trademark bill
would continue for some time, discussions of whether such a
trademark law was truly necessary were more or less over.
Perhaps even more surprisingly, given the reaction to the
trademark bill offered a decade earlier, whether the trademark
law was constitutional never came up. Not only is there no
discussion of it in the record, but it seems that there was no
discussion of the power of Congress in this area at all.84 Rep.
Orestes Cleveland, one of the members of the Committee on
Patents in the House at the time, recalled that "no question was
raised on the power of Congress, under the Constitution, to
82 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2683 (1869).
83 Id.
' See The Federal Trade-Mark Statutes, 19 ALB. L.J. 5, 7 (1879).
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legislate on that subject. My own Impression is that the power of
Congress was considered beyond question-taken for granted in
fact. Nobody, so far as we knew, having ever raised the point."8 5
While one reason for the lack of questions regarding the Act's
constitutionality was that the bill was conceived for and focused
,on other areas of intellectual property law, there was more to it
'than that-the Act became law with the main purpose of the
:trademark sections being to call into effect the treaties that had
and would be made with foreign powers. Not only are the
aforementioned circumstances strong evidence of that purpose,
but the truth of this matter was obvious to contemporary
observers.8 6 While domestic trademarks were, perhaps, not
absent from the consideration of the 1870 Act, they were neither
the impetus for the law nor the prime reason for its passage and
seem to have been of no more than evanescent concern. Given
this, the reason for the lack of concern for the constitutionality of
the bill becomes apparent-Congress saw itself as simply
executing international treaties. This foreign focus in trademark
legislation, however, would not last long, as the lobbying for the
next bill would demonstrate.
D. The Criminal Trademark Act
Following the trademark act, Congress's next action was to
pass legislation moving labels to the patent office, 7 but despite
some confusion and early legislative history to the contrary, this
was not a trademark law."8 In 1876, however, Congress did
amend the trademark laws directly and passed a law
85 Id.
86 Id. at 6 ("In order to give full effect to the treaties with Russia, Belgium and
France, which were negotiated in aid and encouragement of the commercial
relations between the countries mentioned and the United States, Congress enacted
the registration act of July, 1870."); BROWNE, supra note 36 at v ("[T]he principal
object that [the 1870 Act] had in view, it must be confessed, was the matter of
reciprocity.").
87 Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 3, 18 Stat. 78, 78-79 (1874).
" See generally Fargo Mercantile v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 F. 823 (8th Cir.
1924) (discussing how Congress did not intend the labels to be trademarks); PATRY,
supra note 79, § 1:35 (citing the author's work-in-progress "The Unwanted
Copyrights") (discussing the early implementation of the Act). The original
conception of this law had specifically classified labels and prints as trademarks, but
the final version specified that labels and prints were not. Fargo, 295 F. at 826;
PATRY, supra note 79, § 1:35. Nonetheless, there was some confusion, and some
courts held that prints and labels were, in fact, trademarks. Schumacher v. Wogram,
35 F. 210 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
[Vol. 83:827
IN SEARCH OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES
substantially expanding the penalties for trademark
infringement, making trademark infringement a criminal act
under federal law. 9 The prosecutions at issue in the Trade-Mark
Cases would be under the 1876 Act.
Only a few years after it was passed, this Act was denigrated
at length on the floor of the House. Explaining why it should not
be reenacted after the Trade-Mark Cases, the author of the 1881
Act stated that:
The bill was introduced into the Senate and passed there
without discussion. It was so carelessly written that the
language covered commerce wholly within the States, as well as
without. It was so hastily gotten up that its short title is
ungrammatical and the Supreme Court did not know what
Congress intended to express by the act.9"
While certainly dramatic, this misrepresents the bill's actual
history. In fact, the 1876 Act was debated rather extensively,
going back and forth between Houses with differing amendments
multiple times. The 1876 Act represented the victory of more
moderate elements in the House of Representatives as compared
to the more severe bill, which the Senate advocated.
The origins of the 1876 Act were largely borne of concerns of
domestic commerce, unlike the 1870 Act it supplemented." By
1876, twenty-two states provided for criminal remedies for
trademark infringement,92 but such remedies could be difficult to
enforce, and a need was seen for uniformity. The bill was
introduced by Sen. Roscoe Conkling as Senate Bill 846 of the
Forty-fourth Congress, and petitions soon flooded into Congress
from manufacturers in New York, Massachusetts, and
Pennsylvania. The main lobbyist for this bill was Edward
89 Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 273-74, 19 Stat. 141, 141 (1876).
90 10 CONG. REC. 2704 (1880).
91 Whilst making available the same remedies in America as those abroad was
mentioned, reciprocity does not seem to have been the primary motivation.
92 Letter from Edward W. West, Of Counsel, N.Y. Merchs., to Hon. Geo. F.
Edmunds. Chairman of the Judiciary Comm. (May 11, 1876) (on file with the
author). The states included all those with any trademark law prior to 1870, along
with: Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. Twenty-one other states did not have such a
provision in their criminal laws. Id.
93 Petition from the Merchants, Bankers, Manufacturers, Traders, and Others of
Mass. to the Senate and House of Representatives (June 24, 1876) (on file with
author); Petition from the Merchants, Bankers, Traders, Manufacturers, and Others
of N.Y. to the Senate and House of Representatives (May 22, 1876) (on file with
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West, a New York lawyer who represented the "New York
Merchants." 94 Mr. West presented a series of points supporting
the bill to Congress, alleging that the existing remedies at law
were "tedious, unsatisfactory, and cost much more than any
damages recovered," in part because the specific amount of
damages had to be proven-a difficult task.95 Furthermore, an
injunction was easily ignored, as the pirate's brother or friend
would simply take over the business, requiring a new proceeding
to get a new injunction.96 West then noted that in France,
trademark counterfeiting was already a crime and that America
should give the same options to trademark holders in foreign
countries that it had treaties with as they had in their home
country.97 These points were then reprinted as a pamphlet, along
with the text of the bills, the petitions, and op-eds from the New
York Times and New York Commercial Journal (calling the
proposed criminal penalties "really too light") in favor of the
bill.98
While the merchants financed this campaign in favor of a
federal law criminalizing trademark infringement, Congress was
substantially less eager. On May 18, 1876, the bill was
introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary.99 It was referred back with amendments on June
26th,10 and debate was commenced on June 29th, which was
opened by Mr. Conkling explaining how the Committee had
dramatically lengthened the prison terms from the original
bill.1°1
Following the reading of the various agreed-to amendments,
Senator Dawes asked if the bill was meant to also allow for a
cause of action against those manufacturing goods that are quite
author); Petition from the Merchants, Bankers, Manufacturers, Traders, and Others
of Penn. to the Senate and House of Representatives (June 8, 1876) (on file with
author).
9 See West, supra note 92.
9 Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
97 Id. at 3.
" Pamphlet on Trademarks, In the matter of the petitions of the Merchants,
Bankers, Traders, Manufacturers, Corporations, and others of New York, Boston,
Philadelphia, and Other Cities to Congress that Senate Bill No. 846, be made law
(on file with author).
99 4 CONG. REC. 3146 (1876).
11 Id. at 4133.
101 Id. at 4234.
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similar to trademarked goods-for instance clothing of similar
design-to which Senator Conkling answered in the negative; it
was simply meant to punish knowing trademark infringement. 10 2
After this short discussion, the Senate passed the bill on June 29,
1876.103 The House then proceeded towards consideration of the
bill, but after the clerk began to read the bill, Rep. Cox advised
that it be referred to the House Committee on Patents instead,
and it subsequently was.0 4
In July of 1876, the House Committee on Patents returned
with an amended version of the Senate bill.'05 The Committee's
changes were generally aimed at softening the bill's bite in three
critical respects: the state would have the burden of proof to
prove willful intent to defraud with counterfeit marks; money
paid in damages would return to the government, since the civil
cause of action would remain; and the forfeiture of counterfeit
goods would not be required. 10 6 After several minor amendments
from Rep. Conger were likewise added, the House passed the bill
as amended.10 7
This was not, however, the end of the matter. On July 31,
the Senate disagreed with the amendments of the House and
resolved to create a conference of the two Houses to resolve the
disagreement. 0 8  On August 11, 1876, the House took up the
Conference Report, which offered a compromise between the
House and Senate versions, launching a heated debate on the
matter. 10 9 Rep. Hewitt noted that the New York City Junk
Dealer's Association objected to the bill on the grounds that many
times "cast-off articles" such as bottles would still bear the
trademark of the former manufacturer; he asserted that the bill
had not been given the necessary attention to allow for it to be
passed."0 Rep. Sampson rejected the assertion that the bill had
been hastily considered and also noted that Rep. Hewitt had
previously introduced a bill calling for even stiffer penalties
102 Id. at 4234-35.
103 Id. at 4235.
104 Id. at 4493.
105 Id. at 4775.
lO See id.
107 See id.
1o See id. at 5014. The conference was comprised of Reps. Bagley, Hartzell, and
Sampson, as well as Senators Conkling, Frelinghuysen, and Stevenson. Id. at 5478.
109 See id.
110 Id.
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against trademark violators.'11 The House then voted and
rejected the Conference Report.112 With precious little time left
in the session and with some reservations, Sen. Conkling decided
that the House bill was "better than no bill at all," and on his
recommendation, the Senate receded from its disagreement with
the House.11
3
While there was some haste in the bill's passage, the
situation was far from being that of a punitive bill passed with
little or no debate. Rather, as a result of the delay arising out of
substantial debate and consideration, the far more moderate
version of the bill prevailed.
II. THE PATH TO THE TRADE-MARK CASES
For a short period of time, federal trademark law bloomed.
Following the passage of the 1870 Act, additional trademark
treaties were entered into, including treaties with Austria-
Hungary,"' Germany,1 1 5 Great Britain, 1 6 and Brazil. 1 7  The
constitutionality of the federal trademark was not immediately
questioned by the courts or lawyers, and these laws were applied
repeatedly, most famously by the Supreme Court in McLean v.
Fleming."" After the criminal trademark act raised the stakes
for trademark infringement, however, both judges and lawyers
began to question the constitutionality of the federal trademark
laws.
... Id. at 5478-79. Rep. Hewitt asserted that he had introduced that bill at the
request of his constituents but did not personally agree with the bill. Id. at 5479.
There is no record of Rep. Hewitt introducing such a bill in the Forty-fourth
Congress.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 5453.
14 See Trade-Mark Convention, U.S.-Austria-Hung., Nov. 25, 1871, 17 Stat. 917.
115 See Consular Convention, U.S.-German Empire, Dec. 11, 1871, 17 Stat. 921.
16 See Declaration Affording Reciprocal Protection to Trade-Marks, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., Oct. 24, 1877, 20 Stat. 703.
117 See Agreement Concerning Trade-Marks, U.S.-Braz., Sept. 24, 1878, 21 Stat.
659.
118 See 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (describing the federal common law definition of
trademark as "consist[ing] of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant in order to designate the goods he
manufactures or sells to distinguish the same from those manufactured or sold by
another").
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A. Duwell v. Bohmer
The first reported case on the constitutionality of the
trademark acts, Duwell v. Bohmer, 19 has frequently been
characterized as opining that the Intellectual Property Clause of
the Constitution did encompass trademarks. This
characterization is not quite accurate, but the case did come to
stand for such a holding, and it led directly to the commentary
that led to Leidersdorf and then the Trade-Mark Cases
themselves.
Duwell was reported from oral proceedings by William
Searcy Flippin, and the background of the case is not discussed
beyond a statement that this was a civil case for infringement of
a mark that had been registered under the federal law. 2 °
Counsel for the alleged infringer filed a demurrer, arguing that
the court had no jurisdiction to hear the case as there was no
statute giving the court jurisdiction over the defendant, never
mentioning the Constitution. 2 ' Rather, the statute granting
jurisdiction in the federal courts in intellectual property matters
only mentioned copyrights and patents, 122 which the infringer's
counsel took to mean that Congress had meant jurisdiction in
trademark matters to lie in the state courts, as it had before the
1870 Act, thus barring subject-matter jurisdiction.123 Counsel for
the alleged infringed party responded that there had always been
jurisdiction over copyright and patent claims under the federal
laws, that the trademark laws were part of the copyright laws (to
which it was numbered consecutively as part of one integrated
act), and that the entire Act was enacted pursuant to Congress's
119 8 F. Cas. 181 (S.D. Ohio 1878) (No. 4,213).
120 Unfortunately, the files of the Southern District of Ohio for this period are in
some disarray, and the original case file could not be located.
121 Duwell, 8 F. Cas. at 181. A demurrer is a "pleading stating that although the
facts alleged in a complaint may be true, they are insufficient for the plaintiff to
state a claim for relief and for the defendant to frame an answer." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 465 (8th ed. 2004). In most jurisdictions this has been replaced by the
motion to dismiss. Id.
122 U.S. REV. STAT. § 629. The statute states that "The circuit courts shall have
original jurisdiction [of] all suits at law or in equity arising under the patent or
copyright laws of the United States." Id. The 1870 Act specifically provides for
federal jurisdiction for both patent and copyright cases, with no such section for
trademarks. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 206, 215. As the trademark
sections were added last to the bill, it is most likely that the failure to amend this
section for trademarks was simply an oversight, but it is within the realm of
possibility that it was intentional.
123 See Duwell, 8 F. Cas. at 181.
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power under the Intellectual Property Clause.'24 It was further
noted that federal courts had ruled on trademark matters in the
past where both parties were from the same state and where
jurisdiction had not been questioned. 125
As such, the question raised by the demurrer was not
whether Congress had the power under the Copyright Clause to
enact the 1870 Act-the parties were in agreement that Congress
held the power. The reason the citizenship of the parties was
relevant was because the infringer argued that the court had no
jurisdiction because the statute giving the federal courts
jurisdiction in the 1870 Act only mentioned copyrights and
patents, and there was neither diversity of citizenship nor the
minimal amount ($500 at the time) in controversy. 126
The question in Duwell was one of statutory interpretation,
not of constitutional law: Did the jurisdictional section of the
1870 Act include trademarks? If it did, then neither diversity nor
$500 was at issue since subject matter jurisdiction existed due to
the statute. Judge Swing, like both parties in the case, did not
question that the trademark laws were validly enacted under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 127 Regarding the question
that was raised, he found little guidance from other
authorities, 28 but since Bump's Treatise, The Law of Patents,
Trade-Marks, and Copy-Rights, took it as a given that the circuit
courts had jurisdiction, and the headings of the law make it clear
that the Act was meant to encompass all three forms of
intellectual property, the court held that it had jurisdiction to
hear the case. 29
While the case itself did not address the general
constitutionality of the trademark laws, there can be no question
that Judge Swing's statement that "[t]he copyright and trade
mark laws all come from the same source. So if the trade mark
act of 1870 be a copyright law, then the court has jurisdiction"13 0
124 See id. at 181-82.
125 See id. at 182.
126 See id. at 181-82.
127 See id.
128 Id. at 183 ("I have looked into every book and in all reported decisions, and
have been unable to find anything in which the question has been determined.").
129 Id. (citing ORLANDO F. BUMP, THE LAW OF PATENTS, TRADE-MARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS 13 (1st ed. 1877)).
130 Id. at 182.
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practically invites the question of whether the Trademark Act of
1870 was, in fact, a copyright law for constitutional purposes. It
would be raised directly before the courts soon enough.
B. Leidersdorfv. Flint
Setting the stage for the Trade-Mark Cases decided one year
later, the U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of
Wisconsin found the trademark laws unconstitutional in a
written opinion by Judge Charles E. Dyer.13 ' The underlying
dispute was between Bernhard Leidersdorf and Henry Mendel,
purveyors of tobacco under a singularly offensive name with the
image of an African individual, and John G. Flint, purveyor of
tobacco under a marginally less offensive name with the image of
a Native American individual. The plaintiffs sought an
injunction on the grounds that Flint's trademark constituted an
infringement of the Leidersdorf trademark.132 Both parties were
from and doing business in Milwaukee, and there was no
evidence that Flint's product was sold outside Wisconsin.
Although the marks seem rather different from this description,
the colors of the trademarks, their composition, the ways the
letters are formed, and their general appearance are not so
different. 133 Furthermore, the complainant provided evidence of
actual confusion on the part of consumers3 3 and evidence that
the Flint trademark was intended to fool consumers. 35
Roughly a month and a half later, Flint's counsel responded
to the allegations with a general demurrer, alleging that the
federal court was without jurisdiction in this matter. 36  The
demurrer does not specify which arguments were raised as to
jurisdiction, nor has a record of the oral argument before District
Judge Dyer and (Supreme Court) Justice Harlan survived.
"I' Leidersdorfv. Flint, 15 F. Cas. 260 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1878) (No. 8,219).
132 Id.; see also Rosemary J. Coombe, Marking Difference in American
Commerce: Trademarks and Alterity at Century's Ends, 10 CAN. J.L. & Socy 119,
126 (1995).
133 Affidavit of Bernhard Leidersdorf, Leidersdorf, 15 F. Cas. 260 (No. 8,219)
(referencing Exhibits A and B) (on file with author).
"I Affidavit of John Acker at 2, Leidersdorf, 15 F. Cas. 260 (No. 8,219) (on file
with author).
131 Affidavit of George Richards at 1, Leidersdorf, 15 F. Cas. 260 (No. 8,219) (on
file with author) (arguing that the Flint trademark was made using the same
typeface as the Leidersdorf trademark); Affidavit of John Marr at 1-2, Leidersdorf,
15 F. Cas. 260 (No. 8,219) (on file with author) (same argument).
136 Leidersdorf, 15 F. Cas. at 260.
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Judge Dyer's opinion-with the concurrence of Justice Harlan-
speaks for itself though, at least regarding the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution.
The court did not concern itself with the technical question
involved in Duwell, implicitly accepting the holding of that case
and not disputing statutory standing. Rather, the court turned
directly to subject matter jurisdiction under the Constitution,
noting that "[t]he only clause in the constitution from which it
can be well claimed congress derives its power to legislate upon
the subject is [the Intellectual Property Clause]. "  The court
then noted that in order for trademarks to fall under that clause
of the Constitution, "it must be necessarily assumed that the
maker of a trade mark is an author or inventor, and that a trade
mark is a writing or discovery within the meaning of that
clause."38 Judge Dyer then immediately stated that "[a]rgument
can hardly be needed to demonstrate that a law regulating trade
marks is not, in any just sense, a copyright law."'39 He explained,
building around the concept of authorship core to the copyright
provisions of the clause:
The general meaning of the term copyright, is an author's
exclusive right of property in the work which he produces. It
includes the right of the citizen who is an author of any book or
writing, any literary, dramatic or musical composition, any
engraving, painting, drawing, map, chart or print, and of
models or designs intended as works of art. It is something
which appertains to authors who, by their writings and designs,
promote the advancement of literature, science and the useful
arts. An author, by standard definition is one who produces,
creates or brings into being; the beginner, former or first mover
of anything; hence, the efficient cause of a thing. The term is
appropriately applied to one who composes or writes a book or
writing, and in a more general sense to one whose occupation is
to compose and write books or writings.4 °
With this fairly narrow view of authorship as its standard, the
court then applied a similarly high standard for inventorship,
noting that: "[s]o, too, invention implies originality. Originality,
not mere mechanical dexterity, is the test of invention .... To
entitle one to the character of an inventor, he must himself have
131 Id. at 261.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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conceived the idea embodied in his improvement. It must be the
product of his own mind and genius."14
The court looked to trademarks and found that:
The dissimilar characteristics of trade marks, and copyrights,
and inventions for which patents may be granted, have been
pointed out or illustrated in various adjudicated cases. A trade
mark has been very well defined as one's commercial signature
to his goods. It may consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter,
form or device, if adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant in order to designate the goods he manufactures or
sells, to distinguish the same from those manufactured or sold
by another, so that the goods may be known in the market as
his, and to enable him to secure such profits as result from his
reputation for skill, industry and fidelity.
The basis of a trade mark right is primarily the encouragement
of trade. 14
2
Under this analysis, it was already clear that a trademark
was not included under the Intellectual Property Clause, but the
court did not stop there, noting that "[t]he name, word, mark,
device, or symbol constituting a trade mark may be devoid of
novelty, originality, and of anything partaking of the nature of
invention." Beyond that, the court observed that the right to
trademarks existed at common law, whereas the right to
copyrights and patents existed only in the Constitution, and the
"limitation in time [for their duration] is imposed by the
constitutional provision itself. ' 144  Furthermore, an inventor
receives consideration for his registration of the patent, and in
return for the protections of the patent laws, the inventor
"make[s] his invention known and available to others, and
ultimately... give[s] it to the public."145  While that argument
has some resonance in copyright law as well, it is especially true
in terms of inventions, where they could simply be kept a trade
secret. Closing its analysis, the court concluded that:
A copyright is limited by time, a trade mark is not. A copyright
is limited territorially, but a trade mark acknowledges no
boundaries. They are unlike in their natures.
141 Id. (internal citations omitted).
142 Id. (internal citations omitted).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 262.
145 Id.
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In every aspect suggested, and in other respects which might
be suggested, it would seem that the analogy between property
in the use of a trade mark and a patent for an invention, and
between a trade mark right and a copyright fails. Property in a
trade mark exists independently of statute. It is otherwise with
inventions and discoveries.'46
With this in mind, the court came to the conclusion that "[tihe
maker of a trade mark is neither an author nor an inventor, and
a trade mark is neither a writing nor a discovery within the
meaning and intent of the constitutional clause in question."147
In its analysis, the court effectively conflated the two pertinent
questions-whether a trademark was a copyright or patent and
whether, even if not a copyright or patent, a trademark
nonetheless falls within the Intellectual Property Clause, which
does not limit itself by its own language to copyrights and
patents. Rather, it treated them as one and the same, regarding
a copyright as the conduit for authorship and a patent as the
conduit for inventorship and considering a trademark a plausible
subspecies of either.
The opinion then concluded, in cursory fashion, that neither
the Commerce Clause nor any other grant of power to Congress
authorized the Trademark Act of 1870.148 This was unsurprising
given the purely intrastate nature of the matter and the more
limited view of the Commerce Clause prior to the 1930s.
Likewise, the treaty power went unaddressed, and it does not
seem likely that it was even argued.
As discussed above, the grant of the demurrer in this case
was covered extensively in the news sources of the day and
prompted a great deal of contemplation in the legal journals. The
newspapers likewise chimed in, with the New York Times
asserting that "[n]o recent judicial decision will attract more
general attention in legal, and especially commercial circles."149
The Times noted that the decision would at least "unsettle" the
146 Id.
147 Id.
14 Id. Interestingly, it is not clear that Justice Harlan agreed on this point.
During the oral argument at the Supreme Court, he commented that the
u'commerce' point had not therein been considered." William H. Browne,
Correspondence: Has Congress the Authority To Legislate on Trade-Marks, 14 AM. L.
REV. 156 (1880).
149 The Constitutionality of the Trade-Mark Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1878, at
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law regarding the Act's constitutionality and that the decision
was given "still greater" importance because Justice Harlan
concurred in the judgment. 150 The Times felt it likely that the
next court to rule on this issue would be the Supreme Court. The
next day, the Times printed a letter noting the "obvious
astonishment and alarm of the mercantile community" at the
decision but admitting that Judge Dyer's opinion was conclusive
on the point of whether the trademark laws could be justified
under the Intellectual Property Clause, and that even before the
opinion, few felt to the contrary. 15 1 However, he asserted that
"the real pith of the subject [was] elbowed into a corner and
dismissed with such scanty consideration"-the Commerce
Clause.152 Both pieces in the Times also noted that common law
trademark rights remain.
Leidersdorf and his counsel appealed the ruling to the
Supreme Court in a filing with the circuit court in Milwaukee
November 11, 1879.153 However, the decision in the Trade-Mark
Cases came down less than a week later-making the appeal
moot-and counsel for Leidersdorf asked that the clerk of the
circuit court refrain from transmitting the appeal to the Supreme
Court. 5 4 With the argument over the federal statutes now over,
Leidersdorf turned to the state courts in Wisconsin, and the
matter was pending through at least 1880."'1
C. Unreported Cases
While the above reported cases came to the fore, scores of
unreported cases involving trademark law were likewise ongoing,
as others accused of trademark violations in federal court came
to realize they might not even need to contest the facts of their
case to escape the charge. Most of these cases have faded into
the woodwork of history, but some record has survived of two of
150 Id.
151 Henry P. Wells, Letter to the Editor, The United States Trade-Mark Law,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1878, at 4.
152 Id.
'r Appeal, Leidersdorf, 15 F.Cas. 260 (No. 8,219) (copy on file with author).
'54 Letter from Carpenter and Smith, to Edward Kurtz, Clerk of the Circuit
Court (Nov. 18, 1879) (copy on file with author).
1 Leidersdorf v. Flint, 7 N.W. 252 (Wis. 1880). This whole matter (and several
other trademark issues) would later be lampooned as being a fairly ridiculous
question. Irving Browne, Monkey or Man, 3 GREEN BAG 513 (1891).
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them: the decision of the Maryland District Court in United
States v. Ryder,156 and the decision of the Pennsylvania District
Court in Day v. Walls.15
7
In the Ryder case, the defendant was charged with violating
a trademark described as a "red color" on kerosene lamp oil,
which had been registered as a trademark the previous year by
an individual in Philadelphia.18  This was a question of
interstate commerce, and in any case, Judge Giles denied his
request for a demurrer, explaining that while he personally had
doubts as to the act's constitutionality, "a lower court should
never hold an act of Congress void." Besides, that trademark act
had already been amended by Congress in 1876 and applied
many times by lower courts and even the Supreme Court in
McLean v. Fleming.'59 This argument for deference would not
find many adherents, although it may have had it been
published.
On the same page in which it reported Leidersdorf, the
Philadelphia legal newspaper reported that Judge Cadwalader,
in the district court in Philadelphia, had agreed with that case's
holding in the case of Day v. Walls. The case involved labels for
soap, for which the defendant's attorney filed a demurrer arguing
that the 1876 Act was beyond the powers of Congress.160 As was
the case in Leidersdorf, the parties were all citizens of the same
state.161 Judge Cadwalader's specific rationale was not discussed
beyond that he was in agreement with the holding in Leidersdorf,
and the demurrer was granted. 6
2
D. The Law Journals
Simultaneously, a lively debate on this subject was taking
place in various law journals. While in recent years there has
156 United States v. Ryder, No. 4616 (D. Md. July 11, 1878) (case on file with
National Archives, Southeastern Div., Morrow, GA).
157 7 F. Cas. 278 (E.D. Pa. 1878).
158 Ryder, No. 4616 at 2.
'5 The Federal Trade-Mark Statutes, 19 ALB. L.J. 5, 7 (1879).
160 Another Adverse Trade-Mark Decision, SCI. AM., Dec. 28, 1978, at 401. The
mark in question was the word "bleacher" or "bleaching" together with a picture of
scales or other symbols. Id. Presumably the other case referred to is Leidersdorf. Id.
The demurrer also made the same argument as in Duwell-that the court lacked
jurisdiction under the text of the statute. The demurrer in the case is on file with the
author.
11 Hugh Weightman, Trade-Marks, 29 AM. L. REG. 304, 305 (1881).
162 Walls, 7 F. Cas. at 278.
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been much hand-wringing over the lack of influence of law
reviews,'63 it is difficult to underestimate their importance here.
Perhaps even more significantly for modern purposes, they
demonstrate that the court decisions in Leidersdorf and the
Trade-Mark Cases were not isolated or hugely surprising at the
time.
The debate was kicked off by the publication of a two-part
article in the Central Law Journal by Wm. Ritchie shortly after
the publication of the decision in Duwell, on August 23rd and
30th, 1878.11 In the first installment of the article, Mr. Ritchie
simply made the case that a trademark is neither a copyright nor
a patent, while in the second, he made the case that trademarks
are not covered within the text and spirit of any reasonable
construction of the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution.'65 Far more than the decision in Duwell itself
(which does not seem to have been widely known before these
publications), these articles did much to raise controversy about
whether the trademark laws were constitutional.
In response to this article, a Nashville lawyer named R. McP.
Smith penned a letter to the Central Law Journal, asserting that
he had discussed the constitutional bases of the trademark laws
with the trademark department at the Patent Office in
Washington. According to Mr. Smith, the trademark department
felt that the trademark law was based not on the Intellectual
Property Clause of the Constitution but rather on the Commerce
Clause-it "disclaimed [the Intellectual Property Clause] as the
basis for [the trademark act]."166 Mr. Smith felt that the
assertion that trademarks do not fit within the Intellectual
Property Clause "required no argument," and the articles that
would follow revealed that this sentiment was nearly universal
among the legal minds of that period.'67
16 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992); Adam Liptak,
When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2007, at A8.
1'4 Wm. Ritchie, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Trade-Mark Cases 1, 7 CENT.
L.J. 143 (1878) [hereinafter Ritchie I]; Wm. Ritchie, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in
Trade-Mark Cases 1!, 7 CENT. L.J. 163 (1878) [hereinafter Ritchie II].
1' See Ritchie I, supra note 164, at 145; Ritchie II, supra note 164, at 164.
16 R. McP. Smith, Letter to the Editor, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Trade-
Mark Cases, 7 CENT. L.J. 198, 198 (1878).
167 Id.
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The decision in Leidersdorf cited the Ritchie articles and
mentioned that they had been written with "evident care."168
After the Leidersdorf decision, several more articles would
appear in legal journals, giving the issue substantial visibility as
the Supreme Court's intervention came to seem inevitable.
The leading trademark authority of the day, William Henry
Browne, weighed in on the Leidersdorf decision in a popular
newspaper-the New York Tribune. 69 He did not take issue with
the holding that a trademark is not a copyright or patent,
viewing this as self-evident to a layman.1 70 Rather, he took issue
with the assertion that a trademark was not commerce under the
terms of the Constitution. Nonetheless, he had no issue with the
assertion that a purely intrastate trademark was not covered by
the Commerce Clause-instead, he felt that this was not the case
in Leidersdorf.'7' The same argument would be made some two
weeks later in the Albany Law Journal, where a lengthy article
on the subject would agree that a trademark was not included
under the Intellectual Property Clause but assert that intrastate
commerce was incidental to interstate commerce, and thus the
trademark laws were constitutional.1 72
Additionally, some began to argue that the power to enact
the trademark law emanated not from the Commerce Clause but
from the power to execute treaties. In an article in the New York
Tribune, the anonymous author noted that "[firiends of the law
contend that the National Government may make treaties. And
treaties may properly stipulate for mutual protection of trade-
marks of subjects of one government within the dominion of
another, and therefore, Congress may pass a general trade-mark
law as incidental to enforcement of treaties."'73 Although this
argument was generally not the primary argument used by
proponents of the Act, it would come to prominence later, as the
usefulness of the Commerce Clause in this matter would become
clouded.
Thus, the prognosis was fairly grim for the argument that
the power to legislate on trademarks arose from the Intellectual
168 Leidersdorfv. Flint, 15 F. Cas. 260, 262 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1878) (No. 8,219).
169 William Henry Browne, Constitutionality of Federal Legislation as to Trade-
Marks, 7 CENT. L.J. 495 (1878) (reprinted from the New York Tribune).
171 Id. at 496.
171 Id.
172 The Federal Trade-Mark Statutes, supra note 159.
173 Trade-Mark Quandry, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1878, at 4.
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Property Clause of the Constitution. Aside from the frequently
criticized Duwell case and the unreported Ryder decision, both
the bench and bar were of the opinion that the key question in
regard to the trademark statute's constitutionality was whether
intrastate trademark use was incidental to interstate commerce
or something more; the argument that a trademark was a
copyright or patent was seen as a losing one. The fact that the
argument that the power to enact a federal trademark law
emanated from the Intellectual Property Clause was dismissed
by every subsequent observer was doubtless an important factor
in the government's decision not to argue this before the
Supreme Court.
III. THE TRADE-MARK CASES
A group of prosecutions against knock-off champagne and
whiskey sellers would comprise the unlikely genesis of one of the
most important cases to deal with the Constitution and
intellectual property in American history.
A. The Prosecutions
The Trade-Mark Cases originated in criminal prosecutions in
both New York and Ohio for the sale of spirits with illicit
trademarks, but in many ways, the similarities ended there.
1. The New York Cases
It had long been the "prevalent opinion" that a majority of
the champagne with foreign labels sold in New York was actually
manufactured domestically and given a counterfeit label.174 As
part of the effort to fight this, numerous prosecutions were
brought against sellers of champagne in New York who were
engaging in such practices.
On May 7, 1878, Emil Steffens was charged with possessing
and selling counterfeit trademarks of G. H. Mumm & Co., a
maker of champagne from Rheims, France. 7 5 On the same day,
Adolph Wittemann was charged with possessing and selling
counterfeit trademarks of Kunkelmann & Co, also a maker of
114 A Case of Champagne, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1878, at 3 (describing a different
prosecution).
175 Transcript of Record at 1, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (No. 705).
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champagne from Rheims, France. 176  Neither Steffens nor
Wittemann were actually selling counterfeit champagne, but
they were label makers whose counterfeit labels were attached to
American sparkling wine. 177  The two prosecutions were
intertwined and would be so regarded throughout their
pendency. The defendants retained the same counsel, who plead
a general demurrer in both cases on May 13, 1878, asserting
simply that the indictments were "not sufficient in law." 78 The
demurrer was argued before Judge Charles L. Benedict in the
circuit court on May 29, 1878. 179 Thereafter, the U.S. Attorney
for the district took over (the case was a private complaint at
first, although there was coordination with the U.S. Attorney),
and the demurrer was reargued in mid-October of that year
before Judge Benedict and Judge Samuel Blatchford.' ° The
judges were unable to agree so they filed a Certificate of Division
of Opinion with the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the question:
"Can the [1876 Trademark Act], under which this indictment is
found, be upheld, wholly or in part, as a law necessary and
proper for carrying into execution any of the powers vested in the
Congress by the Constitution of the United States?"18 This
certificate was filed on January 8, 1879.182
Thus, the majority of the Trade-Mark Cases came to the
Supreme Court. They were ideal cases for the proponents of the
Act, involving foreign trademark holders protected by the 1869
Treaty with France and by their registrations with the Patent
Office under that treaty. The connection with international
17' Transcript of Record at 1, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (No. 711).
177 The Trademark Law, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 19, 1879, at 4 [hereinafter
NY Post Trademark Article] (calling the accused "label makers"). The Post is one of
the few sources from that time to use the modern spelling. A small irony of this case
is that both Steffens and Wittemann later became highly successful. Emil Steffens
became a rich man in New York as owner of one of the largest lithographing
establishments in the country. Drugged for Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1895, at
14 (regarding the divorce of his son). Adolph Wittemann went on to even greater
success and fame as the co-owner of the Albertype Company, which produced many
postcards and view books. Finding Aid, Collection V-18: The Albertype Company,
The Historical Society of Pennsylvania (2004).
178 Transcript of Record, supra note 175.
179 Id.
180 Letter from Coudert Bros. to Stewart L. Woodford, U.S. Dist. Attorney (June
22, 1878) (on file with the National Archives, Northeast Division, U.S. Attorney
Correspondence).
181 Transcript of Record, supra note 175.
182 Id.
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commerce and treaty obligations of the original Act would have
been difficult to dispute and were made more prominent. Had
the Ohio case not been joined, the outcome may well have been
completely different.
2. The Ohio Case
On August 28, 1878, arrests were made of W. W. Johnson, T.
E. McNamara, and N. S. Reeder.' They stood accused of seven
slightly varying charges of violating the trademark of Charles F.
O'Donnell and his assigns for whiskey with a label reading
"O.K."'1' The defendants were successors in interest to one S.N.
Pike and manufacturers of spirits in Cincinnati.1 85 Johnson
claimed that Pike had used the mark and had continued to do so
but never registered it, rather relying on common law
protection.18 6  On December 10, 1878, criminal charges were
formally brought for violations of the 1876 Trademark Act in the
Southern District of Ohio.1 7  The defendants then filed a
demurrer, arguing that the court was without jurisdiction to hear
the case and that the claims were "insufficient in law to
constitute an offense."' Judges John Baxter and Phillip B.
Swing (the same Judge as in Duwell) could not reach an
agreement as to whether the Act was constitutional, and thus
sent the question to the U.S. Supreme Court on February 20,
18 Something New in the Whiskey Trade, CINCINNATI COM., Aug. 29, 1878, at 8.
Transcript of Record, supra note 175, at 2.
185 Johnson v. Schenck, 13 F. Cas. 831, 833 (C.C.D. La. 1877) (No. 7,412)
(holding that W.W. Johnson and Co. held the exclusive right to Pike's trademarks).
l86 The Law of Trademarks, CINCINNATI GAZETTE, Nov. 20, 1879 (talk with
W.W. Johnson). Johnson seems to have been rather voluble with the press, and
immediately after his arrest fired off a letter to the Cincinnati Commercial asserting
that O'Donnell was a troublemaker, pointing to his low reputation in Cincinnati and
several instances where he took money and never fulfilled his end of the bargain.
Those Counterfeited Trade-Marks-Card from W.W. Johnson, CINCINNATI COM.,
Aug. 30, 1878. Interestingly, "O.K." stands for "Old Kentucky." Id.
187 Certificate of Div. in Opinion between the Judges of the Circuit Court of the
U.S. for the S. Dist. of Ohio, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (No. 719).
188 Transcript of Record, supra note 175, at 5. The first argument was a strange
one to make because it was precisely the argument that this same court ruled
against in Duwell. A local lawyer asserted that he had argued the constitutionality
of the trademark laws in a case shortly before these, but after that case was decided
on other grounds, the defendants in this case took it up. Law of Trademarks, supra
note 186 (talk with L.M. Hosea).
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1879, on Certificate of Division of Opinion. 8 9 In April 1879, the
Attorney General requested that all pending trademark cases be
consolidated and heard together, thus joining this case with the
New York cases. 190
In terms of the statutes in question, this case was not any
different than the others. In practice though, the cases were
entirely different if the copyright clause would prove insufficient,
as would prove the situation at the Supreme Court. The fact that
the defendants and plaintiffs were from the same state and that
the commerce was primarily local would make this a hard case
for advocates of the law' 91 and quite akin to the facts in
Leidersdorf. The plaintiffs in this case also made a wise choice in
retaining as their counsel one of the top lawyers in Cincinnati,
George Hoadly, who was already twice offered a position on the
Ohio Supreme Court and became the state's governor in 1883.192
Knowing that the Ohio prosecutions offered them a stronger case,
the New York defendants declined to argue separately before the
Supreme Court, forcing the Act's defenders to focus on the Ohio
prosecutions in this consolidated matter. This consolidation
more than anything would influence the Court's decision on the
Commerce Clause.
B. The Briefs
Although the government's argument before the Court is
reproduced in the published version of the Trade-Mark Cases, the
best guide to all the arguments raised before the Court can be
found in the briefs submitted by the various parties.
As has been seen, the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution was already roundly rejected by the legal
community as a rationale for trademark legislation. The
Attorney General recognized this, and although the argument
was not rejected in his brief against Wittemann and Steffens, it
was not argued seriously. Rather, the Justices were simply
provided with the Duwell opinion, and no further argument was
1'9 Transcript of Record, supra note 175, at 5. Unsurprisingly, Judge Swing
remained on the side of the Act's constitutionality. Law of Trademarks, supra note
186 (talk with W.W. Johnson).
190 Motion to Advance, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (Nos. 1070, 1084).
191 Transcript of Record at 1, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (No. 719).
1 Id. at 5; Ohio History Central, George Hoadly, httpJ/www.ohiohistorycentral.
org/entry.php?rec=180 (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
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made on this point.193 Rowland Cox, in his brief for G. H. Mumm
against Emil Steffens, went much further and "conceded that the
power to legislate upon the subject of trade-marks is not
deducible from that clause of the Constitution, which provides for
the granting of patents and copyrights. It must be sustained, if
at all, under the commercial clause and those of a cognate
nature."194
The brief of Coudert Brothers on behalf of the Kunkelmann
& Co. against Wittemann did not even mention the Intellectual
Property Clause, effectively dismissing it out of hand.195 Rather,
like the Mumm Brief, it argued for the Commerce Clause-and
the treaty power.196 It has been asserted that the treaty power
was not argued before the Supreme Court, 197 but this is
manifestly untrue-both the Mumm and Kunkelman briefs made
this argument.
These briefs show clearly both that the argument later
approved in Missouri v. Holland was not inconceivable in 1879
but, equally, how little precedent there was for the notion. In the
Mumm Brief, counsel was forced to make the naked argument
that
Is it possible to reason that the Government of the United
States is without power to make a treaty with Great Britain
whereby it may protect the trade-marks of its people within
British jurisdiction?
193 See Certificate of Div. in Opinion between the Judges of the Circuit Court of
the U.S. for the S. Dist. of Ohio at 5, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (Nos. 705, 711).
Indeed, the Attorney General asserted immediately thereafter that "We maintain
the constitutionality of the statute upon.. . the commerce clause of the
Constitution." Id. The direct implication is that this is the only argument the
government put its faith in.
194 Argument on Behalf of the U.S. at 3, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (No.
705) [hereinafter Mumm Brief]. Cox was the attorney for G.H. Mumm and Co.,
representing them from the original criminal action. He was already an authority on
trademark law and would be one of the key advocates in the coming debate leading
to the 1881 Act. See, e.g., History of the Bench and Bar of the Greater New York,
Rowland Cox, 5 AM. LAW. 345, 353 (1897). Interestingly, Rowland Cox was the
grandfather of Archibald Cox, Jr., of Watergate fame. KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD
COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 4 (1997).
195 See Brief on the Part of Kunkelmann & Co. at 11-13, Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (No. 711).
'" See id.
197 See, e.g., Cross, supra note 1, at 375.
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If the Government of the United States has that power, it has
the power to afford reciprocal protection by legislation. It has
the power to provide for the registration of foreign trademarks.
I do not attempt to locate the power. If the United States are a
nation, it exists.
198
This argument was essentially rhetoric, and no support was
given in favor of it. The Kunkelman Brief treated the issue more
extensively and more in line with the modern scholarly
arguments in favor of a robust treaty power, looking back to the
writings of the Founding Fathers. 199 Nonetheless, it too could not
find any case law in favor of its proposition, rather relying on a
fairly similar appeal to logic:
[I]f the Statute of 1876 carries out and puts into operation and
effect the treaty with France, the power to enact such a law, as
the one more immediately under consideration, is clear, unless
the treaty be a dead letter, and the obligations incurred by the
United States be without any binding force or effect.200
Interestingly, a paragraph asserting that the commerce power
was sufficient to enact these statutes in relation to the discussion
of the treaty power was crossed out of the Kunkelman Brief,
indicating that it meant to argue for an independent treaty
power, not one powered by the Commerce Clause.2°'
The briefs for the Attorney General, Mumm, and Kunkelman
against Wittemann and Steffens all made a similar argument at
their core-that the Commerce Clause permits regulation of not
only interstate commerce, but also of the instrumentalities
therof.2°2 The Attorney General and Mumm briefs further
asserted that if intrastate activity was incidental to interstate
commerce, the regulation could still be upheld.2 °3
For all parties, it was necessary to prove that use of a
trademark fell under the rubric of "commerce" in the
Constitution. The case turned to by the prosecution's briefs to
198 Mumm Brief, supra note 194, at 12-13 (italics in the original).
199 See Brief on the Part of Kunkelmann & Co., supra note 195, at 11-12.
200 Id. at 12.
201 See id. at 25-26.
202 See Brief on the Part of Kunkelmann & Co., supra note 195, at 26 (quoting
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875)); Certificate of Div. in Opinion
between the Judges of the Circuit Court of the U.S. for the S. Dist. of Ohio, supra
note 193, at 6-7; Mumm Brief, supra note 194, at 21-22.
203 See Mumm Brief, supra note 194, at 21-22; Certificate of Div. in Opinion
between the Judges of the Circuit Court of the U.S. for the S. Dist. of Ohio, supra
note 193, at 15 (quoting Wheeling Bridge Case, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433 (1856)).
862 [Vol. 83:827
IN SEARCH OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES
argue this point was the Supreme Court's fairly recent decision
in Welton v. Missouri. °4 In that case, a peddler was accused of
selling goods without a license, as was required by Missouri
statute. °5 Justice Field's opinion provided an expansive vision of
the commerce power that the proponents of the law hung their
hat on:
Commerce is a term of the largest import. It comprehends
intercourse for the purposes of trade in any and all its forms,
including the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of
commodities between the citizens of our country and the
citizens or subjects of other countries, and between the citizens
of different States. The power to regulate it embraces all the
instruments by which such commerce may be conducted. So far
as some of these instruments are concerned, and some subjects
which are local in their operation, it has been held that the
States may provide regulations until Congress acts with
reference to them; but where the subject to which the power
applies is national in its character, or of such a nature as to
admit of uniformity of regulation, the power is exclusive of all
State authority.
It will not be denied that that portion of commerce with foreign
countries and between the States which consists in the
transportation and exchange of commodities is of national
importance, and admits and requires uniformity of
regulation.
20 6
The argument of the proponents of the law went steadily along
these lines, specifically, that trademarks were "instruments by
which ... commerce may be conducted."207
The Attorney General was the only one forced to argue that
purely intrastate commerce incidental to interstate commerce
nonetheless fell within the scope of the federal commerce power,
although the Mumm and Kunkelman briefs gamely helped as
well. The case turned to for this matter was the landmark case
of Gibbons v. Ogden,2°s and its assertion that "[tihe power of
Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of
every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any
manner, connected with commerce with foreign nations, or
204 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
205 Id. at 275.
206 Id. at 280.
207 Id.
208 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
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among the several States, or with the Indian tribes."" 9 This line
of thinking was continued in the Wheeling Bridge Case,21° in
which the Court noted that "[it will not do to say that the
exercise of an admitted power of congress conferred by the
constitution is to be withheld, if it appears, or can be shown, that
the effect and operation of the law may incidentally extend
beyond the limitation of the power."211 The proponents of the law
put forth a direct analogy that purely intrastate trademark use
was merely incidental to interstate and international trademark
use.
However, the Kunkelman and Mumm Briefs were
ambivalent about this argument regarding purely intrastate
commerce. Both recognized that the facts of their cases were
stronger than those of the Ohio case, and thus made vigorous
arguments that the statute need not be found unconstitutional in
whole even if it was found unconstitutional with respect to
parties from the same state.21 2 The Kunkelman Brief was
substantially more detailed in its argument and citations, but
neither cited a case in which a federal statute had been found
unconstitutional under the positive meaning of the Commerce
Clause and been divided to apply only to interstate commerce.
Although one source asserts that Wittemann and Steffens
filed briefs with the Court, these do not survive.2 13 As such, the
only direct evidence of the arguments made against the law is
the brief of George Hoadly on behalf of the Ohio defendants.
Regarding the Copyright Clause, the core of the defendants'
argument was to ask, "[h]ow can a trade-mark be said to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts,"214 and to answer:
This is the controlling purpose for which the power was granted.
If an invention do not subserve this end, but is frivolous and
useless, or not novel, it is equally valueless in law.
The clause, read distributively, as it should be, grants power,
but only within this stated purpose, to secure the exclusive right
209 Id. at 75.
210 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
211 Id. at 433-34.
212 Brief on the Part of Kunkelmann & Co., supra note 195, at 27-29; Mumm
Brief, supra note 194, at 14.
213 Browne, supra note 148, at 157 (asserting that counsel for Steffens and
Wittemann filed briefs but did not make oral argument).
214 Argument for Defendants at 9, Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (No.
719) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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for limited terms to authors for their writings, and inventors for
their discoveries.
But the purpose, thus stated, enables us easily to perceive, that
if the power of Congress, to legislate upon the subject of trade-
marks, is to be established, it must be by reference to some
other clause of the Constitution. A trade-mark, like a bill of
exchange or policy of insurance, may be valuable as a tool, an
implement of commerce, an adjunct of commercial transactions.
It affects the use of nothing; it merely facilitates the sale of
something. And the foundation of title to a trade-mark is
priority of adoption and actual use in trade.
Except in case of loan or sale, a trade-mark has no function. It
is only in a case of commerce, where minds meet (cum) for the
disposal of merchandise (merx) that the trade-mark has any
part to play in the world. Among savages and nations without
commerce, the trade-mark is unknown; it began with commerce,
and exists only for its assistance, whereas, discoveries were
made in the rudest ages, and are the successive steps by which
civilization ascends.215
This argument would prevail at the Supreme Court and echo the
opinions of others at the time. As noted, this argument went
largely unopposed.
The brief for the Ohio Defendants then discussed the
Commerce Clause, prefaced by a jocular introduction asserting
that there was nothing in the record indicating use of the
trademark outside of Ohio.216 Following that, Hoadly noted that
215 Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
216 Id. at 11. The introduction continues:
We have the right, for aught that appears, to hold our high opinion of our
clients and their goods, and to believe that in the general rush for the very
superior article they manufacture and sell under this trade-mark, no
Kentuckian, deserting his inferior home-made drink, will ever be in season
to buy any, or if he do, to conclude that the temptation for immediate
consumption will be too strong for resistance, and that he will drink it
before reaching the bridge or ferry. Doubtless, in this generation, all good
things originate in Ohio, as in the reign of James the First all deserving
persons came from Scotland, but then they required exportation, whereas
the highly cultivated and thirsty people of Ohio furnish a sufficient home
market, at least for whisky, and are even open to the suspicion of assuaging
their thirst with imported liquor also. And however desirable it may be that
liquor of our client's manufacture should be substituted for the vile article
which has decimated the Indian tribes, the record furnishes no suggestion
that any "O.K." or "Seal and Ribbon" whisky has ever reached, or is likely
to reach, the parched throat of the red man. Ohio, we may believe, has not
yet more than enough for the uses of her own sons and daughters.
Id. at 12.
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Gibbons was clear about purely intrastate commerce; it only
permitted regulation with a connection to interstate commerce.217
The brief then noted the previous holding in United States v.
DeWitt,21 8 which had found unconstitutional a federal statute
setting standards for the sale of lamp oil without requiring that
it be in interstate commerce, 21 9 and it cited additional cases that
discuss the limitations of the commerce power.22 ° The brief then
noted that some counts of the information did not even
contemplate trade but simply charged the Ohio defendants with
counterfeiting without any commercial actions, and that such
obviously could not fall within the Commerce Clause. 221 Finally,
the brief noted that the Act of 1876 was unconstitutional as
applied since it was being applied without any evidence of
interstate trade.222
This is the only direct evidence of the argument for the
defendants, but the brief is surprisingly limited. Nowhere is it
argued that a trademark is not used in commerce for purposes of
the Commerce Clause, but only that the commerce must be
interstate. In addition, there was no opposition to the Treaty
Clause argument. The Supreme Court's opinion limited itself to
the same issues as the Hoadly Brief.
C. The Argument
The cases were argued on October 22, 1879,223 pursuant to a
motion to advance the hearing filed by the Attorney General the
previous March. 24 The motion was granted March 31, 1879, with
217 Id. at 13 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824)).
218 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869).
219 See id. at 44-45.
220 Id. at 45 & n.4.
221 Argument for Defendants, supra note 214, at 20-22 (internal quotations
marks omitted).
222 Id. at 22-23.
22 Forged Trade-Marks, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1879, at 4.
224 Motion to Advance, supra note 190. The motion itself requests a hearing on
April 21, 1879, but this was not to be. The motion mentions the interest of the
Secretary of State, but this came at the request of the French Minister. The French
Ministry took quite an interest in the case, as its domestic industries were affected
both by the specific suits and more general question raised, and as such, asked the
Supreme Court for a copy of the decision as soon as it was issued. Letter from Sec. of
State on behalf of French Minister to D.W. Middleton, Clerk of the Supreme Court
(Nov. 22, 1879) (on file with author). The U.S. Patent Office made a similar request.
Letter from Comm'r of Patents to McKinney Requesting the Decision (Nov. 17, 1879)
(on file with author).
866 [Vol. 83:827
IN SEARCH OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES
the hearing to be on the second day of the October Term of 1879.
Counsel for Wittemann and Steffens chose not to make oral
argument,225  and no transcript exists of George Hoadly's
argument on behalf of the Ohio defendants. However, William
Henry Browne did record a few tidbits from the argument,
including that in response to a question from the Court, Hoadly
expressly admitted that Congress had the power to regulate
trademarks under the Commerce Clause-it was simply a
question of how much it could encompass.226
In contrast, the reporter for this case included the Attorney
General's argument along with the published opinion. The
Attorney General's argument was the first to note that the Act
had previously been commented on by the Court in McLean v.
Fleming221 and that the Court had thus implicitly given the Act
its imprimatur. 221 His argument then turned briefly to the
argument under the Intellectual Property Clause, saying that it
"demands careful consideration. Undoubtedly, in the legislative
mind they were kindred subjects, and it was thought that the
power of Congress over them might be derived from the same
source."229 Rather than giving this argument a full exposition,
however, he chose "not [to] dwell upon this view of the
question."20 While this was likely a sensible decision given the
general consensus on the merits of the argument under the
Intellectual Property Clause, it was nonetheless fateful in that it
left the forceful arguments of Leidersdorf and the Hoadly Brief as
the only significant arguments regarding the Intellectual
Property Clause-pro or con. The result that the Court
wholeheartedly adopted these arguments is thus unsurprising.
The Attorney General then turned to the Commerce Clause,
generally following the contours of his brief that trademarks
were instruments of commerce.23' It is significant that the
Attorney General felt the need to note that the law's
"constitutionality in its application to the trade-marks of the
subjects of foreign countries is the question presented by the
225 Browne, supra note 148, at 157.
226 Id.
227 96 U.S. 245 (1877).
22' Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 85 (1879).
229 Id. at 86.
230 Id.
211 Id. at 86-87.
2009]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
indictments."232 While this was not accurate with regard to the
Ohio defendants, it was a direct effort to remind the Justices that
the case was not just about the Ohio defendants; the majority of
the cases involved the infringement of marks that were used in
international commerce.
The Attorney General's argument then turned to an
argument under the embryonic treaty power, couching it at times
in terms of a regulation of international commerce.233 The
Attorney General did not, however, specifically argue that the
treaty power went beyond the constraints of the Commerce
Clause. His argument then shifted back to the Commerce
Clause, once again following his briefs argument that incidental
regulation of purely intrastate commerce was permissible.234 His
argument closed with a brief assertion that even if the Act was
unconstitutional regardng purely intrastate commerce, it could
still be saved regarding interstate and international commerce. 235
D. The Decision
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in the Trade-Mark
Cases was announced November 17, 1879, less than a month
after the argument.2 36 The Court opened with a short discussion
of the procedural history of the cases and of trademark law in
general237 and then addressed the Intellectual Property Clause
head-on. The Court noted that "[it may also be safely assumed
that until a critical examination of the subject in the courts
became necessary, it was mainly if not wholly to [the intellectual
property] clause that the advocates of the [trademark] law looked
for its support."23 No doubt, the hearts of the advocates of the
law began to sink when they read the Court assert that "the
effort [to defend the law on these grounds] is surrounded with
insurmountable difficulties."239 What followed was perhaps the
232 Id. at 88.
233 Id. ("The purpose and the natural and reasonable effect of the acts are
to... carry out in good faith and enforce our treaty stipulations on the subject. The
act is a regulation of foreign commerce.").
234 Id. at 89-91.
35 Id. at 91.
236 See infra Part III.E.
237 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92.
1 Id. at 93. As has been noted, this was not accurate according to some prior
accounts. See Smith, supra note 166, at 198-99.
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93-94.
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Court's most substantive commentary on the scope of the
Intellectual Property Clause in the nineteenth century and
possibly its most influential ever:
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to
invention or discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the
common law is generally the growth of a considerable period of
use, rather than a sudden invention. It is often the result of
accident rather than design, and when under the act of
Congress it is sought to establish it by registration, neither
originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art is in any way
essential to the right conferred by that act. If we should
endeavor to classify it under the head of writings of authors, the
objections are equally strong. In this, as in regard to
inventions, originality is required. And while the word writings
may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original
designs for engravings, prints &c., it is only such as are
original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind.
The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of
intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints,
engravings, and the like. The trade-mark may be, and
generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as
the distinctive symbol of the party using it. At common law the
exclusive right to it grows out of its use, and not its mere
adoption. By the act of Congress this exclusive right attaches
upon registration. But in neither case does it depend upon
novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It
requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious
thought. It is simply founded on priority of appropriation. We
look in vain in the statute for any other qualification or
condition. If the symbol, however plain, simple, old, or well-
known, has been first appropriated by the claimant as his
distinctive trade-mark, he may by registration secure the right
to its exclusive use. While such legislation may be a judicious
aid to the common law on the subject of trade-marks, and may
be within the competency of legislatures whose general powers
embrace that class of subjects, we are unable to see any such
power in the constitutional provision concerning authors and
inventors, and their writings and discoveries. 240
The thrust of this holding is simple yet powerful; the
Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause specifically imposes a
requirement that a copyright be a fruit "of intellectual labor,
240 Id. at 94. (Emphasis added).
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embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like,"
which is "original" and "founded in the creative powers of the
mind."241  A patent need only fill the lower threshold of
"originality," but it must also be an "invention," a significantly
more restrictive term than "writing." The argument can be made
that this holding was not the necessary holding based on a
sensible reading of the Intellectual Property Clause, and this is
correct. This reading, however was hardly novel and, as has
been demonstrated, represented the dominant strain of thought
regarding the Intellectual Property Clause at the time.
The Court then turned to the Commerce Clause as an issue
and was faced with a more problematic question. 2  Not only was
there strong authority on both sides, but the merits of this
argument were starkly different among the different defendants
in the consolidated matter. The Court attempted to deal with
this in exactly the manner the defendants had hoped they
would-it found a resolution, which would apply to all
defendants equally, relying on a technicality rather than facing
the issue head-on.243
In dicta, however, the Court indicated that it was not at all
clear that trademarks were valid instruments of commerce
within the meaning of Welton.2' The Court noted that "[e]very
species of property which is the subject of commerce, or which is
used or even essential in commerce, is not brought by this clause
within the control of Congress," and proceeded to cite several
examples of its decisions regarding this matter that were
analogous to trademarks, including bottles, an insurance policy,
and a stamp duty, which were held to not be instruments of
commerce. 245  The counterexample of the case of Almy v.
241 Id. (emphasis omitted).
242 Id. at 95-96.
243 Id. at 97-98.
24 Id. at 95.
245 Id. Interestingly, the Court's sources for these examples were dubious-the
cases cited do not stand for the stated propositions regarding the Commerce Clause.
Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 73 (1850), was cited for the proposition that
"barrels and casks, the bottles and boxes in which alone certain articles of commerce
are kept for safety and by which their contents are transferred from the seller to the
buyer, do not thereby become subjects of congressional legislation more than other
property." Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 95. In fact, that case stands for the
proposition that a state may legitimately tax a foreign bill of exchange even though
it is an instrument of commerce and is specific to the taxing power. Nathan, 49 U.S.
(8 How.) at 74. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), simply asserts that an
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California246 was also noted by the Court, where a stamp duty
had been held to be unconstitutional. 247
The Court did not actually make such a move, however.
Rather, the Court held, without citing authority for the
proposition, that a statute premised on the Commerce Clause
must limit itself, by its own terms, to interstate commerce.248
This holding continues to echo nowadays, 249 but it is not clear
what the basis for this ruling is; it does not seem to have been
argued or even mentioned by any of the parties. What is clear is
that the ruling neatly addressed the central problem of the Court
regarding the Commerce Clause-the differences between the
parties.250 By looking solely at the statute on its face, the Court
was able to avoid discussing whether its ruling would only apply
to certain parties or all of them, and avoid a precedent that
would say that Congress could regulate intrastate commerce or
could not regulate international commerce.
Finally, the Court turned to the question of whether the
statute could only be found partially unconstitutional and held
that it could not for two reasons. The first reason given was that
there was no evidence that the trademarks in question were used
in interstate or foreign commerce.25 1 This assertion is somewhat
perverse in light of the fact that the Kunkelman and Mumm
trademarks at issue in the New York prosecutions were
specifically described as being French in origin, and as such, the
simplest explanation is that the Court was focusing on the Ohio
insurance policy is merely a contract and not an instrument of commerce, an
argument which does not seem terribly relevant here-no one could argue that a
trademark is a contract. Id. at 183, superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12
(2006), as recognized in City of Charleston v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 869 F. Supp.
378 (D.S.C. 1994).
246 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1860).
247 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 95; Almy, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 173.
24 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96.
When, therefore, Congress undertakes to enact a law, which can only be
valid as a regulation of commerce, it is reasonable to expect to find on the
face of the law, or from its essential nature, that it is a regulation of
commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the
Indian tribes. If not so limited, it is in excess of the power of Congress.
Id.
249 See infra Part V.
250 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 95-98.
251 Id. at 98 ("First, the indictments in these cases do not show that the trade-
marks which are wrongfully used were trade-marks used in that kind of
commerce.").
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defendants. The second argument was that the Court cannot
read words into a law to limit it and make it constitutional; it can
only excise them.252  Since limiting the statute to commerce
would add words to the statute, it was beyond the Court's power.
The Court briefly noted that it "wish[ed] to be understood as
leaving untouched the whole question of the treaty-making
power over trade-marks, and of the duty of Congress to pass any
laws necessary to carry treaties into effect."253 The Court
concluded by stating that since the Registration Act of 1870 was
unconstitutional, the 1876 criminal act that the cases were
brought under was likewise unconstitutional.5 4
The decision was certified to the lower courts, and America
entered a new era of trademark law.
E. The Reaction
While the result in the Trade-Mark Cases could have been
anticipated by contemporary attorneys, the decision still took the
public at large as a surprise. It even accomplished the rare feat
of giving trademark law more than token coverage in the
newspapers.
Initial reports of the decision hit the newspapers the day
after the case was decided on November 18, 1879.255 These
articles consisted chiefly of summaries of the decision and
speculation as to its effects, noting that there had already been
some 8,000 trademark registrations, and 200 more were pending
before the Patent Office. 256 The law also brought some $10,000
252 Id. at 98-99. Although it is not cited, this follows the doctrine was set forth
by the Court three years previously. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (U.S.
1876).
253 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 99.
254 Id.
255 See, e.g., An Unconstitutional Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1879, at 1; Supreme
Court, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1879, at 6; The Trade-Mark Laws Invalid, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1879, at 1; The Validity of Trade Marks, ATLANTA DAILY CONST., Nov. 18,
1879, at 1.
256 The Trade-Mark Law Swept Away, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1879, at 4. This
number was later clarified; there had been 7,777 registrations from the law's
enactment to November 11, 1879. Untitled Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1879, at 4.
There had been 2,150 trademarks registered from 1870 to the beginning of 1875;
1,138 in 1875; 959 in 1876; 1,216 in 1877; 1,577 in 1878; and 859 thus far in 1879.
Id. This amounted to nearly $200,000 in fees paid to the government in return for a
thirty-year registration. Id. By the end of 1879, there had been another fifteen
registrations, making the total amount 7,792, for a total of $211,960.00 in fees.
Letter from H.E. Paine, Comm'r of Patents, to Rep. Armfield (Jan. 9, 1880) (on file at
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in revenue to the Patent Office annually.257 In response to the
decision, the Patent Office released a circular on November 22,
announcing that all registrations would be suspended pending
further action from the applicants.258  Further registrations
would only be permitted if the person had full knowledge and
understanding of the Supreme Court's decision. 25 9 However, fees
could not be refunded absent a specific act from Congress to that
effect. 260 Apparently, many trademark holders had immediately
written to the Patent Office asking for their fees to be refunded,
and one went even further and sued the federal government for
breach of contract and requested that the registration fee be
returned.261  The Court of Claims denied the request, holding
that "[ilt was for him to determine, before paying the fee,
whether it was under the statute worth $25 to him to have his
trade-mark registered," taking into account the risk that the
registration statute could be unconstitutional.262 Of course, this
rationale did not mollify those who had paid the registration fee.
The Comissioner of Patents, himself, was fairly distressed
regarding the decision, feeling that "many business interests
would suffer" due to this decision.2 63
Those in favor of a limited federal government were greatly
pleased by the descision. For example, the New York Post
published an editorial when word of the decision came down
praising the Court for its limitation on congressional power and
hoping that "we shall hear less henceforth about Congressional
regulation of railroad and insurance companies and the like."264
the National Archives). Another forty were registered in the first two months of
1880. See Bowen Letter, supra note 66.
257 The Trademark Decision, ATLANTA DAILY CONST., Nov. 22, 1879, at 1
[hereinafter Atlanta Daily Const. Trademark Article].
258 Registration of Trade-Marks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1879, at 12.
259 Id.
260 Id. This was, in part, because the contingent fund of the patent office was not
large enough to meet the demand for refunded fees. See Atlanta Daily Const.
Trademark Article, supra note 257.
261 See Woodman v. United States (Woodman's Case), 15 Ct. Cl. 541, 541 (1879).
262 Id. at 545.
26 Trade Marks, CINCINNATI COM., Nov. 19, 1879.
26 Conservative Views of the Constitution, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 19, 1879, at
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The newspapers also reported that this decision would be a
"surprise to many lawyers, as well as a disappointment to the
mercantile community."265 While it may have been unnerving,
disappointment soon abated as many began to openly assert that
for domestic trademarks, common law rights were sufficient. For
instance, the New York Tribune published "A Talk with a Patent
Lawyer," in which it was noted that the property right in
trademarks remained, the only difference was the right to sue in
federal court. 6 Large corporations like Procter & Gamble were
likewise nonplussed, concerned mostly about getting back their
registration fees.2 67  At a meeting of the United States
Trademark Association ("USTA") on the afternoon of November
24, Orestes Cleveland, the group's president, asserted that the
effects of the decision were not dramatic; the main value of the
law had been the existence of a registry for trademarks that was
useful for proving priority in court.268 After further discussion
among the members of the USTA, it was agreed that new
legislation was needed, if solely to provide for the registration of
foreign trademarks.269 While there is little mention in the news
of excessive worry on the part of domestic merchants, proprietors
of foreign marks were concerned-French merchants in New
York had already written their ambassador in Washington,
asking that he push to enact a new law to enforce the 1869
treaty.270 The gears of government were already grinding in this
direction.
IV. IN THE SHADOW OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES
At a cabinet meeting on November 18, 1879, it was decided
to recommend to Congress that an act to protect foreign
trademarks be passed.27' Domestic trademarks were
265 The Trade-Mark Law Swept Away, supra note 256.
266 No Cause for Alarm-A Talk with a Patent Lawyer, N.Y. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1879,
at 8. The Post published a similar article but the interviewee asserted that the
effects of the decision would be more negative, as the 1870 Act had a positive effect
on the level of trademark piracy. NY Post Trademark Article, supra note 177.
267 Law of Trademarks, supra note 186 (talk with Procter & Gamble).
26 The Trade-Mark Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1879, at 8.
269 Id. This was necessary since other countries such as France would only
recognize American marks in their courts if American courts offered French
trademark owners recourse.
270 Trade-Marks, A Discussion in This City, N.Y. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1879, at 2.
271 See A Replevin Imbroglio, The Trade-Mark Matter in Cabinet, THE WASH.
POST, Nov. 19, 1879, at 2; From Washington, Meeting of the Cabinet, THE BOSTON
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conspicuously absent from this recommendation, but nonetheless
legislative proposals would include an act purely for foreign
trademarks-an act based on the Commerce Clause to protect
interstate trademarks as well-or a constitutional amendment
that would allow for the revival of the old Act, which protected
even intrastate trademarks.
A. The Immediate Legislative Response
Only two weeks had passed before Congress made its first
response to the Supreme Court's decision, in the form of a
proposed constitutional amendment from Rep. Moses A. McCoid
of Iowa on December 2, 1879.272 The amendment specified that
"Congress, for promotion of trade and manufactures, and to carry
into effect international treaties, shall have the power to grant,
protect, and regulate the exclusive right to adopt and use trade-
marks."273 Standard practice was for a proposed constitutional
amendment to be sent to the Judiciary Committee, but this
proposed amendment was committed to the Committee on
Manufactures (which Rep. McCoid sat on) instead, which took up
the matter in a subcommittee (which Rep. McCoid also sat on).274
William Henry Browne was invited to discuss the proposed
measure at a committee hearing. He stated that the language of
the amendment was not optimal and proposed alternative
phraseology, but his recommendations were not adopted.275 At
the meeting on December 8, the clerk was directed to furnish
copies of the decision to other members of the Committee,276 and
the bill was reported without amendment three days later, on
December 11.277 This was an extraordinarily fast turnaround
time, especially considering that most of the Committee had not
even read the decision until the 8th, which suggests that Rep.
GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1879, at 1. The matter was apparently discussed again by the
cabinet a week later. See Trade-Marks: The Recent Decision, N.Y. TRIB., Nov. 25,
1879, at 2.
272 H.R.J. Res. 125, 46th Cong. (2d Sess. 1879).
273 Id. § I. The remainder was boilerplate for a proposed amendment.
274 The other members of the subcommittee were Reps. Hall and Beale. At the
National Capital, In the Committee Rooms, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1879, at 1.
276 See Browne, supra note 148, at 159. He later observed that "we may deduce a
lesson of warning from what might have resulted in great perplexity [owing to the
awkward language of the proposed amendment], in thus playing with the edge-tools
of hasty legislation." Id.
276 More Money Recommendations in Congress, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1879, at 1.
217 10 CONG. REC. 78 (1879).
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McCoid was essentially operating on his own with the Committee
rubber-stamping it. Unsurprisingly, the report was submitted by
Rep. McCoid for the committee and it laid out the reasons for the
proposed amendment of "great and immediate importance."278
The report went through the number of trademarks registered,
the fees received for their legislation, the various trademark
treaties which had been concluded, and other background
material on the issue.279  The report then turned to the two
questions the Committee felt it had to answer: whether this issue
warranted a constitutional amendment and whether the existing
state common law would be sufficient. It determined that federal
control under a constitutional amendment was necessary. The
argument made was that trademarks were increasingly
important in the world,28 ° that national control was particularly
necessary because of the natural constraints of state control,28'
and because national control was required to carry out the
provisions of treaties.282 Perhaps overly optimistically, the report
then urged that the measure be passed (and submitted to the
states) before the upcoming adjournment for the holidays in a
scant few weeks.28 3 The entire House was less receptive to Rep.
McCoid than the Committee on Manufacturess, however, as
other forces were in motion.284
On December 9, 1879, Rep. Robert F. Armfield, a lawyer
from North Carolina, introduced his own proposal to remedy the
damage done by the Supreme Court in the form of a standard
bill.21  This bill created a registry in Washington for marks used
in commerce with foreign nations, Indian tribes, or between
states 286 and allowed for both damages and equitable remedies
against infringers of trademarks.287 The Register of Trademarks
278 Id.
271 Id. This report gave an updated tally on fees received as of December 9, 1879,
at $211,750. Id.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Press reaction to the amendment was generally negative. For instance, one
paper ran an editorial lambasting the amendment as a flippant move to modify the
design of the Constitution regarding federalism. See Tinkering the Constitution,
HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 11, 1879, at 2.
285 H.R. 2573, 46th Cong. (2d Sess. 1879).
286 Id. § 2.
27 Id. § 8.
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would be empowered to decide among claimants regarding who
held the valid mark, with the decision reviewable to the en banc
Supreme Court for the District of Columbia.288 The bill was then
committed to the Committee on Commerce.289 The bill grew
substantially after its first introduction, going through thirteen
to twenty-seven sections, and incorporating a modified version of
the 1876 criminal trademark legislation.29 °
Although the House of Representatives heard the report on
the proposed amendment on December 11, 1879, it was not
discussed further that day.2 91 The report was once again read on
December 17, 1879, 292 and discussion followed.293 The initial
reaction was of surprise that a constitutional amendment was
being offered that had not been vetted by the Committee on the
Judiciary.294 A motion to recommit the amendment to the said
committee was made, but it did not immediately pass, and Rep.
McCoid was adamantly against such an action.295 He explained
that the subcommittee and full Committee on Manufactures had
given the measure serious consideration, and furthermore, that
legislatures in twenty-one states would be meeting the coming
winter and then not again for two more years, giving the
amending process additional urgency.296 Finally, he noted the
importance of international trademark treaties and how the
amendment was needed to effectuate them.297
Rep. Armfield then stood up and argued that a constitutional
amendment was not needed to regulate trademarks since they
were covered by the Commerce Clause and noted that his bill
accomplished this very purpose.298 To this, Rep. McCoid asked
whether the Supreme Court's decision had precluded regulation
under the Commerce Clause, to which Rep. Armfield answered in
288 Id. § 4. This is the modern-day Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
289 10 CONG. REC. 38 (1879).
290 See Memorandum to H.R. 2573, § 19 (1879) (on file with author).
291 See 10 CONG. REC. 78.
292 Id. at 145.
293 Id. at 146-48.
294 See id. at 146.
295 See id. at 146-47. Apparently the measure faced strong opposition from the
Democratic side of the aisle. The Trade-Mark Article Considered, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 18,
1880, at 2.
296 See 10 CONG. REc. 147.
17 See id.
298 Id.
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the negative.299 At this point, Mr. Cox joined in and argued that
both measures should be sent to the Committee on the Judiciary
to determine which course was most prudent. He recalled that
the 1870 Act "passed without much discussion" and felt that this
matter deserved greater scrutiny.300 He also felt that the extent
of the treaty power regarding trademarks needed to be
examined.3 0 ' To this, Rep. Horr from the Committee on
Manufactures, half-jokingly, asked to keep the bill in the
Committee on Manufactures since the Committee had nothing
else to do and, resultantly, had lavished much attention on the
bill.30 2
Rep. McCoid then made the argument in response to Rep.
Armfield that, in fact, a trademark was not an article of
commerce, 30 3 but the battle to pass the amendment quickly was
over; it was "very manifest" that the amendment could not get
the requisite two-thirds majority necessary for a constitutional
amendment.30 4 Both the amendment and the Armfield Bill were
recommitted to the Committee on the Judiciary. 5
B. The Treaty Power Ascendant
A few days prior to the debates in Congress, the New York
Tribune ran an editorial inquiring into the extent to which
Congress could legislate based solely on the empowerment of a
treaty. 6 It noted that a national law was required to effectuate
the treaties America had entered into but felt that "it will be a
new discovery in constitutional law that the President and
Senate can, by making a treaty, enlarge the power of Congress to
legislate affecting internal affairs."30 7  This prospect was
considered risible, and "any legislation which rests on treaties
299 Id. As noted supra, this is a debatable point. The Court did not hold this but
implied it. See supra text accompanying note 251.
300 10 CONG. REC. 147.
31 Id. at 147-48.
302 Id. at 148 ("When I came here, I had an exceeding desire that I might get on
a committee that should sound big and have little to do; and if our Speaker had the
powers of a modem clairvoyant he could not have hit my case better than he did.").
This was met with laughter. Id.
303 id.
304 Tending Towards Debate, In the House, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1879, at 1.
305 Id.
306 Editorial, Trade Trademark Treaties, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1879, at 4.
307 Id.
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must run within very narrow limits.""8 The Tribune proposed
that the solution was to permit Congress to legislate regarding
only foreign marks.
The House Judiciary Committee first took up the trademark
issue on December 18, 1879, and heard from William Henry
Browne for fifty-two minutes on the issue.30 9 Following the
holiday break, Mr. Browne and Rowland Cox, among others,
addressed the Committee on January 14, 1880. 11° On February
4, 1880, a lawyer from New York by the name of Ayres spoke
before the Committee, arguing against the amendment on the
grounds that it would take too long, and that more immediate
relief was needed. 11  On February 6, a subcommittee of
Representatives Nathaniel Hammond, Edward Robertson, and
Frank Hurd was appointed to draft appropriate legislation on the
matter.3 12  An additional hearing was held before the full
Committee on February 12, 1880, at which Mr. McCoid presented
his views .313 His argument was essentially the same as before,
when he argued that his amendment simply presented what
would have been the intent of the framers all along and that no
other solution was adequate to the problem at hand, including a
bill based on the Commerce Clause.314
While the Committee deliberated, individuals in foreign
countries, especially England and France, fretted about the state
of their trademarks in America.31 '5  Although only 317 of the
nearly 8,000 trademark registrations had been to residents of
foreign countries,31 6 it stands to reason that a foreign entity
308 Id.
309 Minutes of the Committee on the Judiciary, 46th Cong., House of
Representatives, at 48 (Dec. 18, 1879).
310 Id. at 54.
311 The Proposition To Create a Department of Agriculture Favorably Received,
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1880, at 1. William Henry Browne also submitted a
memorandum of the relevant trademark treaties that day and testified.
Memorandum, A Trade-Mark Belongs to Commerce, from William H. Browne to the
House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 2, 1880) (on file with the House
Judiciary Committee at the National Archives); Minutes of the Committee on the
Judiciary, 46th Cong., at 75, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 4, 1880).
312 Work in the Committees: The Proposition To Create a Department of
Agriculture Favorably Received, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1880, at 1.
313 The Trade Marks Question, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 13, 1879, at 5.
314 Id.
"' Foreign Trade-Marks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1880, at 4.
316 Letter from Mr. Bowen, Exam'r of TradeMarks, to Rep. Hammond (Mar. 6,
1880) (on file with the House Committee on the Judiciary in the National Archives).
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would have to be of substantial size and import to have their
trademarks used across the oceans. Likewise worried were
American owners of trademarks abroad, whose marks would only
receive reciprocal protection. Since foreign owners currently had
no protection, they held the same measure of safety in their
marks. 17 This gave an added urgency to the push for legislation
for foreign trademarks, while protection for domestic trademarks
would seem far less pressing. This was reflected in the testimony
of Mr. Rowland Cox before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, encouraging a law protecting foreign marks but
declining to comment on protection for domestic trademarks.1
Nearly one hundred firms, representing some $200 million in
trade (in 1880 dollars) and including many companies with active
principals in the USTA, had sent in form petitions requesting
that Congress take action regarding foreign trademarks in the
U.S. in order to protect American interests abroad.31 9 Domestic
trademarks were not commented on once, following the policy the
USTA had decided on shortly after the Supreme Court's decision.
Within the subcommittee, Rep. Hammond took the lead.2 °
He asked the Trademark Examiner several questions, including
whether any marks had been registered prior to the passage of
the Act of 1870,321 what states and industries were most highly
represented in terms of trademark registrations,322 and whether
317 Id.
31 Observations of Mr. Rowland Cox of New York: Hearing on National
Legislation To Protect Trade-Marks Before the Comm. on the Judiciary [hereinafter
Cox Testimony] (prepared testimony of Rowland Cox). The testimony is not dated,
but it was likely given a number of days after the petitions, which were dated
around January 12, 1880. See, e.g., Petition from the Singer Co., to the U.S. Cong. on
the State of Trade-Mark Protection (Jan. 12, 1880) (on file with the National
Archives). There is no mention of Mr. Cox speaking at any hearing in the
newspapers.
319 Cox Testimony, supra note 318, at 1.
320 Nathaniel J. Hammond was the former Attorney General of Georgia and was
regarded
as one of that state's "chief authorities" on constitutional law. THOMAS WALTER
REED, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 556 (1949), available at
http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/cgi-bin/ebind2html.preed cO5?seq=83.
321 See Bowen Letter, supra note 66. As noted, while there had been no actual
registrations, there were several marks deposited by foreign nationals pursuant to
the treaties. Id. at 2.
322 Id. at 3. Medicines, tobbaco, and whiskey were the most frequent
registrations-about one third of the total amount-so it was suggested that states
in which these industries were prominent would be states with the most
registrations. Id.
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the trademark office was profitable. 32 3 He was also the likely
hand behind an unsigned memorandum found in the files of the
Committee on the Judiciary, laying out how the treaty power
provided sufficient authority for a new trademark act.324
The fact that the treaty power was regarded as nebulous and
ill-defined at best, and nonexistent at its worst, formed a major
obstacle to legislation based primarily on it. In this
memorandum, the Committee laid out what would become its
argument-both in the report it would issue and in subsequent
debate-over the applicability of the treaty power to a new
trademark law. It was noted that the framers of the Constitution
had countenanced the treaty power at the very time of the
founding, such as the 1790 Treaty with the Cree and the Jay
Treaty.2 5 Various other historical cases were considered, as well
as the case law in the Supreme Court regarding treaties, before
the memorandum noted the naked core of the argument-that
the treaties had imposed an obligation for Congress to act, and
Congress must, therefore, have that power.326
By early March of 1880, the subcommittee had finished their
work and the House Judiciary Committee agreed to proceed with
a bill rather than the constitutional amendment. 27 Three days
later, the Committee approved a new bill based on the treaty
power and ordered it presented to the full House.2 s At that same
meeting, the Committee decided that Congress did not have the
authority to legislate regarding interstate trademarks-the
Commerce Clause was out.3
2 9
323 Id. at 4. Apparently, it was only costing in administrative expenses one third
of what it received in fees.
324 See Memorandum to the House Comm. on Patents, 46th Cong. (no date)
(unpublished draft).
325 See id. at 1.
326 See id. at 5.
327 See Capital Notes, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1880, at 1 (noting that the Armfield
Bill had been adopted on March 9th). It is likely that there was more a general
discussion, choosing to proceed with a bill rather than the amendment and that a
draft of the new bill was distributed that day. The committee felt that "the subject
was not invested with sufficient importance to warrant a constitutional
amendment." See The UTE Agreement-Wrongs of the Poncas-A Trade-Mark Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1880, at 5.
328 See Capital Notes, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1880, at 1.
329 See id.
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On the same day, the new bill and accompanying report were
presented to Congress.3" The new bill, House Bill 5088, did not
differ much from the Armfield Bill (or the 1870 Act), save for one
critical fact-it applied only to trademarks used in commerce
with foreign nations or Indian tribes.31' The report that
accompanied the bill went into some detail about why this was
so, explaining the bill's basis in the treaty power . 3 2 The report
explained that the Committee had engaged in careful
consideration as to whether the Commerce Clause empowered
Congress to legislate regarding trademarks-and had
determined that it did not.333 It was felt that a trademark was
simply a manufacturer's guarantee, which is not necessary to
commerce. 3 4 However, the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution did give Congress the power to enact legislation
executing treaties validly made by the executive branch with the
Senate's consent. 35  The Committee's only stated authority for
this proposition was United States v. Coombs,336 a case that
seems inapposite. In that case, Justice Story found that the
Commerce Clause extended to acts committed entirely above the
high-water mark in a single state (specifically the salvage of
goods from a sinking vessel) because they implicated questions of
navigation, and thus commerce, and that Congress may make
"all laws necessary and proper to execute their delegated
constitutional powers."33  This uncontroversial statement does
not mean that Congress may make all laws necessary and proper
to execute powers not specifically delegated, but it comprised the
sole justification for the treaty power given by the Committee.
The report then noted that trademarks on patented goods were
also validly protected under the existing patent law, and thus
330 See 10 CONG. REC. 2701 (1880).
s' See H.R. 5088, 46th Cong. (2d Sess. 1880). As subsequently noted, the
criminal trademark act had already been added, and there were additional technical
changes to the bill from the version which was introduced.
332 See H.R. REP. No. 46-561, at 6 (2d Sess. 1880).
... See id. at 5 (the first four pages of the report are the Supreme Court's
decision).
114 See id. It was also noted that only 8,000 trademarks were in use the in the
United States at the time, see id., but this is clearly erroneous. There were only
8,000 registrations of trademarks; it is unknown how many marks were unregistered
and protected by common law.
... See id. at 6.
336 See 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838).
37 See id. at 78-79.
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interstate (and presumably intrastate) trademarks were already
protected. 38  Regarding trademarks on unpatented goods, the
report concluded that the existing common law protections were
sufficient. 3 9 The report then briefly covered the changes the bill
made to the original Armfield Bill, such as the addition of the
criminal trademark provisions, the removal of the appeal process
and the new office, and other small changes.34 ° It resembled the
pre-1879 trademark law "almost verbatim," save for the change
in scope.341
The bill was not discussed for reasons of parliamentary
procedure on March 12342 and not heard from again until April
3. In the interim, the Secretary of State was apparently in
active discussions with Mr. Hammond, urging him to press the
bill, which he did that day.344 After the bill was read, Rep.
Hammond provided some background and revealed that the
Committee had unanimously felt that trademarks could not be
regulated under the Commerce Clause.3 4' He went through the
relevant cases, many of which had been mentioned by the
Supreme Court, regarding whether a trademark was used in
commerce and concluded that, either way, Congress should
refrain from exercising power where it was in doubt:
But valuable as are the opinions of the Supreme Court they
should not be the measure of the power we shall exercise in
Congress. They pass upon State laws said to conflict with the
supreme law, and may give the benefit of doubts in favor of the
Federal power or the States as they like. But Congress is co-
ordinate with the court and the legislative body of the
Government, whose ermine they wear. They must therefore
hold Congressional legislation valid unless manifestly and
plainly unconstitutional. The only safety, then, is for Congress
to solve its doubts against the exercise of power. If it will not,
the result is Congress can do all things not plainly forbidden.
This is at war with the plan of our fathers. That plan restricted
338 See H.R. REP. No. 46-561, at 6.
331 See id. at 6-7.
340 See id. at 7.
341 See id.
342 10 CONG. REC. 1514 (1880).
343 See id. at 2701.
344 See In the Capital, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 27, 1880, at 1.
345 10 CONG. REC. 2702 (1880).
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Congress to the exercise of certain delegated powers. One of
them was regulating commerce. That power was delegated to
the United States that the States might not cripple
commerce 346
With such an approach in mind, it was clear that not only did the
Committee on the Judiciary not feel that it had the power to
legislate interstate commerce, it also felt that it should not have
such a power out of a concern for federalism. Under such a view,
the Committee's looking askance at the McCoid Amendment
makes perfect sense; if the right to legislate regarding domestic
trademarks is inappropriate, then likewise, an amendment to
grant such a right to the federal government is inappropriate.
Rep. Hammond then turned to the question of foreign
trademarks and went through the arguments made in the report
as well as the various relevant trademark treaties.347 He noted
that "in]any foreign trade-marks were lodged [in the Patent
Office] before the act of 1870 was passed" and that "[iut is plain
from the debates that [the 1870 Act] never could have passed had
it not been thought important in aid of those treaties. 348 Of the
petitions the Committee had received, all but one dealt only with
the request for an act to uphold America's treaty obligations.349
Here, Rep. Hammond diverted-with the Committee's
apparent approval-from the bill and moved to strike the
criminal sections of the bill.35 ° In the process, he lambasted the
1876 Act, arguing that "[n]o treaty obligation demanded this act
of 1876" and that the act's provenance was severely flawed. 351 He
346 Id. at 2703.
347 Id. at 2703-04.
' Id. at 2704.
341 Id. Apparently, there was one from Boston in favor of the McCoid
Amendment. Id.
350 Id.
311 Id. His comments continued:
The bill was introduced into the Senate and passed there without
discussion. It was so carelessly written that the language covered
commerce wholly within the States, as well as without. It was so hastily
gotten up that its short title is ungrammatical and the Supreme Court did
not know what Congress intended to express by the act. One of its friends
sought to pass it in the House without a reference, claiming it was a bill to
protect honest merchants and manufacturers. It was referred, not to a law
committee, but to the Committee on Patents, who had nothing to do with
crimes. They reported it back saying four hundred manufacturers,
merchants, and dealers, in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, had
petitioned for its passage. They gave no other reason therefor, but called
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further noted that jail time for trademark infringement seemed
perverse, and, in any case, it was unwise to increase the criminal
jurisdiction of the federal courts without good reason. 52
Furthermore, there were not many federal penitentiaries, so
conviction and imprisonment would frequently be far from home
for the infringer and pose an inappropriately onerous burden.353
He concluded, "[t]he advocates of the bill would invoke the
majesty of the United States to frighten citizens. No such spirit
breathes from the Constitution. If you would not have laws
despised, pass none which you will not enforce. Make laws to
provoke love, not to excite terror."
354
the previous question. At the last moment Mr. Hewitt of New York tried to
protest for the thousands of small dealers in New York who might be
entrapped by its provisions, but it was forced through. It is not strange that
a creature of such hasty and violent birth languished, and, languishing,
died in less than three years. The eight eminent doctors [(the conference
committee)] who tried to save its life said they know not what was its
ailment except that it was stuffed with incongruous food, and that it might
have died anyhow even if it bad not swallowed the States.
Shall we resurrect the corpse? Shall we give to those owners of trade-
marks, protected by treaties which pledged only such protection as our own
citizens have for theirs, this high right which our citizens cannot enjoy in
this country? It would be at least decent to wait till we could put our own
citizens on the same plane with foreigners and Indians. Wait till the
McCoid amendment becomes a part of the Constitution-you who urge its
passage. Do not enact this and then urge McCoid's amendment because the
foreigner and Indian is better protected than our citizen, amend the
Constitution to make it fit a statute.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
352 See id. Rep Hammond again lapsed into colorful language:
On an American vessel in mid-ocean is a young girl returning home. In
charge of the master, she has the right to be secure against even
discourtesy. But forgetful of his duty as a man, despising his sacred trust,
in the darkness of night he attacks her, alone, friendless, helpless, and with
threats seduces and deflowers her. In Georgia we could put one at hard
labor for twenty years for such a crime. Death would be too good for the
scoundrel. But see that man at the bar of a United States court, convicted
of thus violating section 5349 of the Revised Statutes, and hear the judge,
burning with virtuous indignation, pronounce on him the extreme penalty
of the law, a fine of $1,000 and imprisonment for twelve months. And
imagine him adding, "I regret that you are not found guilty of fraudulently
putting a false drink in a bottle having on it the trade-mark of LL whisky;
for then I could punish you at least double as much as I can for this
diabolical crime."
Id.
353 Id.
31 Id. at 2705. This speech is clear evidence that the 1876 Act was not revived
by the 1881 Act, and an 1889 opinion put another nail in the coffin of the 1876 Act
by holding that it "is as much a dead letter as the act of 1870, and was not vivified or
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Turning to the McCoid Amendment, the Committee on the
Judiciary was not persuaded by the reasons given in the report of
the Committee on Manufactures. 55 It was felt that the cost
passing a Constitutional Amendment was greater than just
paying back the fees paid for trademark registrations, and that
the notion that the President could enter into a treaty that
Congress could not execute was absurd.356 Furthermore, Rep.
Hammond felt that the states were perfectly acceptable forums
for resolving trademark disputes, even if a uniform law would be
very convenient.357 Ultimately, while Rep. McCoid felt that the
omission of trademarks from the Constitution was simply a
question of their coming about too late, Rep. Hammond disagreed
vehemently, feeling that the point of copyrights and patents was
to protect the artist and inventor for whom otherwise their toil
would be for naught. 55 Such was not the case with trademarks,
where they simply identified who had made a certain product. 59
In closing his oration, Rep. Hammond noted that all
amendments up to this time had limited the power of the federal
government, not enhanced it, and that it was highly undesirable
to have the power of the federal government enhanced. 60 It is
impossible here to forget that Rep. Hammond was from Georgia,
and it was only a decade and a half since the Civil War. It is
likewise impossible to ignore that three amendments had just
been passed over the opposition of the Southern states.3 61 The
time was simply wrong for any expansion of the federal
government-implicit in Rep. Hammond's views was that the
federal government was already too powerful.
Rep. Hammond's speech was well received by the House. 62
Rep. McCoid rose to respond, but the House recessed instead. 63
He was once again thwarted on the 26th.364 On the 27th, the
given operative force by the act of 1881." United States v. Koch, 40 F. 250, 252
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1889). Despite all this, some were of the opinion that the 1876 Act was
in force even after 1889. See Abdel-Khalik, supra note 8, at 184 n.50.
355 10 CONG. REC. 2705.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 2705-06.
311 Id. at 2706.
359 Id.
360 See id.
361 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
362 See In the Capital, supra note 344.
363 10 CONG. REC. 2706-07.
36 Id. at 2756-57.
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House took up House Bill 5088, and despite some who wanted to
argue its terms, went straight to a vote. 65 First, the requested
amendments were approved (mainly striking out the criminal
provisions) and then House Bill 5088 was passed. 66 Aside from
Rep. Hammond's speech, for which no response was given, it had
never been debated. Rep. McCoid then requested reconsideration
of his amendment, which he considered to be consistent with the
bill that had just been passed.3 67  Rep. Hammond was not
opposed, but, instead, the House adjourned.
The Senate received the bill on the 29th, and it was sent to
the Committee on the Judiciary.6 It may have seemed that the
bill had considerable momentum, but instead it did not get out of
that Committee in the second session of Congress.
C. In the Third Session
Shortly before the Forty-sixth Congress had adjourned its
second session, another bill was sent to the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, which was already considering House Bill 5088.
Senate Bill 1751369 provided merely for registration and that such
registration would be proof of ownership, as the Patent Office
was already doing in the wake of the Trade-Mark Cases. v° As
such, there was no requirement that the mark be used in
interstate or international commerce (although there were
criminal sanctions for engaging in any falsehood in procuring
registration).3 7 1 While the question of a trademark law waited
for Congress to start its third session, there remained occasional
reminders of the difficulty of the situation, where the trademark
law was now in limbo. Foreign manufacturers were leery of
sending their goods to the 1883 World's Fair in New York, and
the USTA created a committee to determine the best solution to
this problem 2.37  At the same time, the USTA remained fairly
" Id. at 2795, 2808. Rep. Claflin wanted to ask whether an act, which only
protected foreigners was proper but was informed that debate was out of order. Id.
at 2808.
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 Id. at 2860.
369 S. 1751, 46th Cong. (2d Sess. 1880).
310 Id. § 1-3.
371 Id. § 9.
372 See, e.g., City and Suburban News, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1881 at 8; Foreign
Trade Marks and the World's Fair, N.Y. HERALD, Jan. 31, 1881, at 6; The New
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indifferent to the effect of the Trade-Mark Cases on domestic
marks, feeling that common law protections were generally
sufficient. 3
The third session of the Forty-sixth Congress began in early
December of 1880, and later in the month the Senate Judiciary
Committee took up consideration of both bills, assigning them to
a subcommittee of Senators Conkling and Davis. 74 Slightly over
two months later, the subcommittee reported favorably on House
Bill 5088, while recommending that Senate Bill 1751 be
indefinitely postponed.37 5 The Forty-sixth Congress was about to
end without a trademark law when the full Committee reported
back House Bill 5088 favorably and without further amendment
on the same day. 76 The following day, the bill passed the Senate
without debate. 77 Two days after that, the President signed
House Bill 5088 into law-on the very last day of the Forty-sixth
Congress. 7 s After one year of inaction, the Senate passed the
bills with remarkable alacrity, but press coverage of the bill's
passage was slight-it was mostly ignored in the face of the
avalanche of other bills passed at the end of the session.
In the Forty-seventh Congress, Rep. McCoid again
introduced a constitutional amendment for trademarks. 79 It was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. and was never heard
from again. ° Meanwhile, the passage of the 1881 Act served to
reassure foreign powers, and within two years of its enactment,
Trade-Marks Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1881, at 4 (discussing the applicability of
the new 1881 Act to the fair); Property in Trade Marks, N.Y. HERALD, Jan. 29, 1881,
at 10 (noting that Belgian manufacturers would not exhibit unless their trademarks
were protected). The fair was never actually held. See A World's Fair in 1892, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1889, at 4 (recounting why the 1883 fair never occurred).
373 Trade-Mark Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1881, at 3; Trade Mark
Registry, N.Y. HERALD, Jan. 18, 1881, at 11. The USTA also considered the
possibility of applying to the New York legislature to make registrations on its own
"with some legal effect and value." Id.
314 11 CONG. REC. 270 (1881).
376 Id. at 2195.
376 Id.
371 Id. at 2284.
378 Id. at 2467.
379 H.R.J. Res. 9, 47th Cong. (1st Sess. 1881).
380 Id.
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trademark treaties were signed with Serbia,8 l Spain,8 2 Italy,8 3
and the Netherlands.3" Not a single nation entered into a
trademark treaty with the U.S. in 1879 or 1880.
D. The Regime of the Trade-Mark Cases
With the passage of the 1881 Act, the shadow of the Trade-
Mark Cases at once grew shorter and stronger. There was once
again a federal trademark law, but its coverage was exceedingly
scant, pursuant to congressional understanding of the Supreme
Court's opinion. With a new law finally in place, the federal
government would paradoxically be able to register a far smaller
number of marks than it had even a month prior. This drop is
simple enough to explain: The practice of registering trademarks
never actually ceased despite the fact that sixteen months passed
with no trademark law. As noted, the Commissioner of Patents
continued to accept registrations, provided the registrant was
made aware of the problematic nature of the trademark laws." 5
During June of 1880, the chief clerk of the Patent Office
resigned to become the new Principal Examiner of Trademarks,
and the question was again raised of what authority there was
for continuing to have a trademark examiner.3 6 The position
was still provided for by Congress, and seventy-five trademarks
had been registered in May 1880.2 7 In December of 1880, the
Attorney General recommended that the practice of registering
trademarks be ceased until a new act was made. In allowing
registrations, "the Commissioner must necessarily entertain
jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to such registration, to
declare interferences, and to decide questions arising under
them.,388
381 Convention of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Serb., art. XII, Nov. 15, 1882,
reprinted in 2 MALLOY, supra note 40, at 1616-17 (stating that all aspects of the
treaty were completed well after the 1881 Act was passed).
382 Trade-Mark Convention, U.S.-Spain, Apr. 19, 1883, reprinted in id. at 1675.
3 Declaration for the Reciprocal Protection of Marks of Manufacture and
Trade, U.S.-Italy, proclaimed Mar. 19, 1884, reprinted in 1 id. at 984.
'8 See Letter from F. T. Frelinghuysen, Sec'y of State to G. De Weckherlin (Feb.
16, 1883), reprinted in 2 id. at 1265-66; Letter from G. De Weckherlin to F. T.
Frelinghuysen, Sec'y of State (Feb. 10, 1883), reprinted in id. at 1265.
381 Registry of Trade-Marks, N.Y. HERALD, June 20, 1880, at 8.
-'m Id.; Notes from the Capital, N.Y. TiMEs, June 20, 1880, at 2.
387 Registry of Trade-Marks, supra note 385.
388 Registration of Trade-Marks, 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 586, 586-87 (1880).
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In response to this, the House Committee on the Judiciary
proposed a resolution asking the Secretary of the Interior to
explain under what justification trademarks continued to be
registered, no doubt in part because the new law would not
provide for domestic registrations." 9 The resolution was passed
immediately after it was proposed.3 90  The Secretary of the
Interior forwarded the letter of the Commissioner of Patents to
the effect that the Patent Office had kept registering trademarks
because, at a minimum, it provided evidence of their use, even if
the remedies of the 1870 Act would not be available. The
Commissioner of Patents assumed that if Congress meant for
them to cease doing so, they would have cut off appropriations-
which Congress had not done. 9'
On February 9, 1881, in the interference proceeding
Braun v. Blackwell,392 the Commissioner of Patents dissolved all
trademark interference proceedings and announced that there
would be no more of them. 93 Blackwell had moved to dissolve
the interference on the grounds that the Commissioner lacked
the authority to conduct the interference, and the motion was
denied on the grounds that the Secretary of the Interior
specifically authorized the proceeding in his letter issued shortly
after the Trade-Mark Cases, allowing registrations to continue
with the registrant's understanding of the situation. 94 Blackwell
then petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to discontinue the
proceeding, and the Secretary issued an opinion directing the
annulment of the interference and directing that the
Commissioner should do nothing more than conduct
registrations-without opining on the validity of the mark. 95 On
the Secretary's orders, all pending interferences regarding
trademarks were annulled. 96
389 11 CONG. REC. 727 (1881).
390 Id.
391 H.R. ExEC. Doc. NO. 46-83, at 1-2 (1881).
392 Braun v. Blackwell, 1881 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 10 (1881).
393 See U.S. PATENT COMM'R, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
PATENTS FOR THE YEAR 1880, H.R. DOC. NO. 46-67, at vii (1881); see also Important
Trade-Mark Decision, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1881, at 2.
'9' Blackwell, 1881 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 10-11.
391 Id.; Suppression of One Class of Interferences, SCI. AM., Mar. 12, 1881, at 161.
39' Blackwell, 1881 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 10-11.
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Once the 1881 Act was passed, it was distributed by the
Patent Office, but prospective registrants were to be informed
that "until time has been taken for preparing regulations and
forms appropriate for administering the law, no action can be
taken by the office on applications, nor can information be given
to correspondents; but persons interested are advised to wait,
before forwarding papers, until rules can be prepared."397 The
public did not have to wait long, and new rules were promulgated
within a month of the Act's passage.398 The rules implemented a
new requirement for registrants: They needed to declare that the
trademark to be registered was used in commerce with foreign
nations or Indian tribes.
Once registrations recommenced, it was clear that the
Commissioner's authorities changed considerably. In the appeal
of a registrant from the denial of an examiner, the Commissioner
of Patents held that the examiner was correct-examiners should
once again consider the legality of the trademark rather than
just registering it mechanically.399 Beyond the requirement that
the trademark is in use in commerce with a foreign nation or
Indian tribe, the criteria for registration were the same as they
had been prior to the Trade-Mark Cases.00
In the following years, there would be repeated attempts to
bring interstate trademarks within the coverage of the federal
trademark laws-the first being in 1885.4°1 In this case and in
others thereafter, the House Committee on Patents would be in
favor of such an act, but the House Committee on the Judiciary
would be opposed.4 °2 In 1895, Rowland Cox, who had advocated
that Congress content itself with legislating regarding foreign
marks in early 1880, presented a paper advocating expanding
391 Trademarks Again, N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1881, at 4; see also The New
Trademark Law: Wherein It Differs from the Act Formerly in Force, WASH. POST,
Mar. 14, 1881, at 2.
"' See generally New Trade-Mark Law, CHIC. TRIB., Mar. 23, 1881, at 3
(explaining the new rules and regulations adopted under the revised trademark
law).
399 See Strasburger & Co., Dec. Comm'r Pat. 23, 23 (1881).
400 See id.
401 COMM. ON PATENTS, REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS, H. REP. NO. 48-2376
(1885).
402 Abdel-Khalik, supra note 8, at 183 n.44. For instance, in 1890, the House
Judiciary Committee reported adversely on a bill to impose criminal penalties for
trademark counterfeiting, noting that trademark regulation did not fall within the
province of the Commerce Clause. H.R. REP. NO. 51-2539 (1890).
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coverage of the federal law to include domestic marks, noting
that both times and the understanding of the Commerce Clause
had changed.4 °3 It would be another decade until this change
occurred.
E. Later Efforts at Constitutional Amendment
Although never successful, the effort for a constitutional
amendment to overrule the Trade-Mark Cases would continue
long after the failure of the 1879 and 1881 amendments.0 4 Even
though the trademark law was amended to include interstate
commerce in 1905405 based on the Commerce Clause, this still did
not give Congress the same latitude regarding trademarks as it
held over copyrights and patents. Attempts to overrule the
Trade-Mark Cases by constitutional amendment would continue
through the 1950s.
1. The Kahn Amendments
Surprisingly, after 1881, there were no attempts to amend
the Constitution to include trademarks until after the 1905 Act.
The next proposed amendment was introduced by Rep. Julius
Kahn in 1911406 and again in 1913.407 This amendment failed to
gain traction, and, indeed, it is completely unmentioned in the
archives of the committee to which it was sent. Aside from the
usual enabling language, the text of the amendment was simple
enough: "Congress, for the promotion of trade and manufacture
and to carry into effect international treaties, shall have power to
grant, protect, and regulate the exclusive right to adopt and use
trade-marks."408
The question is why a congressman who, by his own
admission unfamiliar with the law of patents. 40 9 and presumably
trademarks as well, would find himself proposing such a change
to the Constitution. One possibility is that Rep. Kahn was
403 Rowland Cox, The Constitution of the United States and Its Relation to the
Subject of Trade-Marks, 51 ALBANY L.J. 118, 124 (1895).
404 See Michael J. Lynch, The Other Amendments: Constitutional Amendments
That Failed, 93 L. LIBR. J. 303, 303-09 (2001) (discussing potential constitutional
amendments that subsequently did not pass).
405 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 1, 33 Stat. 724.
4' H.R.J. Res. 159, 62d Cong. (1911).
407 H.R.J. Res. 18, 63d Cong. (1913).
408 Id. (same language in both resolutions).
" See The Kahn Act, 9 BULL. U.S. TRADE-MARK Assoc. 287, 307 (1913).
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working in hand with the USTA, which simultaneously published
an article by Arthur William Barber, advocating a constitutional
amendment on the front page of its bulletin.41 ° This is unlikely,
however, as Barber does not mention Kahn, or his amendment,
once in his article. Furthermore, Arthur William Barber was the
Secretary of the USTA and likely the most influential advocate
for trademarks in the day.41' It is unlikely that an amendment
being pushed by the USTA would have simply died in committee
completely without any additional comment. The more likely
interpretation is that these amendments came from an unlikely
place, the Panama-Pacific Exhibition of 1915.
In 1915, a scant nine years after the devastating earthquake
of 1906, San Francisco hosted a massive exhibition to celebrate
the opening of the Panama Canal in August 1914 and the city's
rebuilding from the calamity less than a decade before.412 As a
representative from San Francisco, Rep. Kahn was one of the
exhibition's greatest boosters in Congress, and a centerpiece of
his efforts was the so-called Kahn Act.4 13 As had been an issue in
1883, foreign powers were reluctant to participate if their
intellectual property was not protected.414 At the urging of
President Taft,415 the Kahn Act provided protections for foreign
intellectual property brought to the convention even if it had not
been registered under normal protocols. The Act further
established a branch patent and copyright office at the exhibition
and allowed for "certificates of registration" for a wide
410 See Arthur Wm. Barber, The Constitution and Trade-Marks, 8 BULL. U.S.
TRADE-MARK ASS'N. 119, 125-26 (1912).
411 See L. E. Daniels, The United States Trade-Mark Association, 33 TRADEMARK
REP. 3, 5 (1943) ("It has been said of Mr. Barber that, during the period of his
incumbency, there was hardly an important amendment proposed in the trade-mark
laws of the United States or of the South American republics that did not embody
one or more wise provisions from his pen.").
412 See A Sense of Wonder: The 1915 San Francisco World's Fair, MOAH.ORG,
June 7-Sept. 22, 2002, http://www.moah.org/exhibits/archives/1915/.
413 H.R. 7595, 63d Cong. (1913).
414 See Austrians Favor Exhibit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1913, at 4. Other states
were also concerned, particularly because California had just introduced a
controversial state trademark law, which allowed for registration without prior use.
Want the State's Trade-Mark Law Amended, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 2, 1911, at 1 (noting
that this would be before the 1911 proposal for the amendment).
415 See President William H. Taft, State of the Union Address (Dec. 19, 1912),
http://stateoftheunion.onetwothree.net/texts/19121203.html; see also The Kahn Act,
supra note 409 (reproducing Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means on
the Kahn Bill).
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variety of intellectual property, including trademarks, for
which said certificate would function as "legal evidence
of... proprietorship."4 16  The Act was opposed on several
grounds, but an important one was that the Kahn Act legislated
regarding trademarks without requiring that they be used in
commerce. 417 Given that these marks were being brought in for
the sole purpose of the exhibition, and not sale, use in commerce
was anything but a sure question at the time with a narrower
reading of the Commerce Clause still in vogue.
Nonetheless, the amendments themselves died a quick and
silent death before the Kahn Act could spring to life,
uncommented on by the surviving records. The most likely
reason is simply that the goal of protecting trademarks at an
exhibition, no matter how prominent, hardly seemed
commensurate with the enormity of the undertaking to amend
the Constitution.
2. The Keogh Amendments
The only attempts at a constitutional amendment regarding
trademarks in recent memory have been the four amendments
proposed by Rep. Eugene J. Keogh between 1949 and 1955.41'
The wording of the four resolutions was identical, and, aside from
the usual enabling language, these amendments merely
stipulated that "[tihe Congress shall have power to regulate the
use and ownership of trade-marks. '41 9  The language of the
amendment does not seem to be based on any of the prior
proposed amendments-which were mostly forgotten by that
time. It was drawn, instead, following the advice of the
amendment's advocates.42 °
416 H.R. 7596.
417 See William H. Kenyon, The Kahn Act: A Criticism, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 52,
53-55 (1914). This viewpoint was disagreed with on the grounds that if the
trademark would be copied domestically, it would inherently invoke a question of
international commerce. See Charles E. Townsend, The Protection of Intellectual
Property at International Exhibitions, 2 CAL. L. REV. 291, 305-06 (1914).
418 H.R.J. Res. 3, 84th Cong. (1955); H.R.J. Res. 331, 83d Cong. (1954); H.R.J.
Res. 27, 82d Cong. (1951); H.R.J. Res. 229, 81st Cong. (1949).
419 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 229.
420 See Letter from Paul Struven, President, Trade-Mark Serv. Corp., to Rep.
Eugene J. Keogh (Mar. 23, 1949) (regarding Trade-Mark Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution) (on file with author) [hereinafter Struven Letter]; see also
Memorandum from the U.S. House of Representatives Office of the Legislative
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The impetus for the amendment was the lobbying
of the Trademark Service Corporation, and, specifically, the
organization's president Mr. Paul Struven.421 Paul Struven had
been lobbying Congress for this amendment at least ten years
prior to when it was first proposed, repeatedly appearing in the
long crawl towards the Lanham Act. The origins of his interest
in the subject stem even further back-from his involvement in
advocating mandatory state registration of trademarks, which
would do away with the common law approach.422 When it
became apparent that arguing for mandatory registration in each
state individually would be a herculean task, he turned his focus
to securing a constitutional amendment that would allow the
federal government to implement mandatory registration in one
fell swoop. In this effort, he stood directly opposed to the USTA,
which firmly opposed mandatory registration schemes and, in
fact, had decades earlier urged a constitutional amendment
specifically to preempt any state-level mandatory registration
laws 423
During the March 15th to 18th hearings on trademarks in
1938, Mr. Struven was a witness and expressed his view near the
close of the hearings that he believed the solution to all the
problems of trademark law Congress was grappling with was a
constitutional amendment. 424 This led to a sharp rejoinder from
Edward S. Rogers stating that that he did not "believe there is
any more chance of getting a constitutional amendment
enacted... and we might as well give up any idea of thinking of
Counsel to Rep. Eugene J. Keogh (including further unchanged draft of joint
resolution text).
421 After mergers and name changes, the company is now CT Corsearch. CT
CORSEARCH, A HISTORY OF INNOVATION, https://www.ctcorsearch.comL/Ctcorsearch
Apps/ctcorsearch/About.aspx?SISD=5, (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). This company was
formed in 1949-according to its own website. Prior to this, Mr. Struven identified
himself as managing director of an organization called the Trade-Mark Sales
Corporation. However, he also identified himself with the Trade-Mark Service
Company as early as 1934. Paul Struven, Letter to the Editor, Trade-Mark
Procedure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1935, at 20.
422 See Paul Struven, Case for State Registration of Trade Marks, PRINTER'S INK,
Oct. 31, 1935, at 81-83; Trade-Mark Rule Argued at Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
1938, at 32.
423 See Barber, supra note 410, at 140-43.
424 See Trade-Marks: Hearing on H.R. 9041 Before Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of
the H. Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong. 104, 176 (1938).
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it."4 25 Undeterred, Mr. Struven continued to send correspondence
to be included in committee hearings despite not being invited
again. A year afterwards, he sent a lengthy set of letters and
memoranda advocating a constitutional amendment to the
subcommittee, which were included in the printed hearing.426
Mr. Struven would send another lengthy memorandum two years
after this, but reaction at the time was minimal.427 Nonetheless,
these memoranda would form a basis for the arguments Struven
presented that led to the introduction of a proposed amendment
in 1949, the first in thirty-six years.
In a memorandum dated March 23, 1949, and sent to Rep.
Eugene J. Keogh of New York, Mr. Struven gave six arguments
for the amendment:
1. "To definitely fix the control of trade-marks within the
United States Constitution."
2. To make moot the question of how far the Commerce Clause
extends in regulating trademarks.
3. To make it easier to allow businesses to deduct trademark
expenses for tax purposes.
4. To clarify the government's ability to enter international
trademark treaties and conventions.
5. To provide a constitutional basis for amendments to fix the
"inequities" of the Lanham Act.
6. To provide a vehicle for government coordination of existing
trademark registration regimes.428
Mr. Struven then closed his letter with an appeal that would
prove problematic in the future-that this amendment was
needed to give trademark owners "a deed of title ownership to
their trade-marks."429 The view of a trademark as pure property
425 Id. Edward S. Rogers was a Chicago attorney and one of the fathers of the
Lanham Act, having provided a draft bill that would be a first version to Rep. Fritz
Lanham.
426 See Trade-Marks: Hearing on H.R. 4744 Before Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of
the H. Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 195-207 (1939) (letter of Paul Struven).
427 See Trade-Marks: Hearing on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before
Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the H. Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 243-50 (1941)
(letter of Paul Struven).
428 Struven Letter, supra note 420.
429 Id.
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interest would be called into question by opponents of the
amendment.430
Roughly one month later, on April 26, 1949, Rep. Keogh
introduced the amendment as House Resolution 229 in the first
session of the Eighty-first Congress.431 He made no statement
when introducing the bill,432 and it was referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary, as is standard for proposed amendments.
In one of the few published comments on these amendments,
Rep. Keogh explained that he wished to "protect trade-mark
owners from the abuses that come from enforced state
registration."433 In private correspondence, though, he was more
equivocal, saying that he hoped to "generate some discussion pro
and con solely with the view of attempting to clarify the status of
the trademarks."434
Outside opposition to the amendment was centralized
around the USTA.435  The organization was at the forefront of
lobbying for trademark reform, but perhaps because so much had
been invested in the current statutory regime (the recently
passed Lanham Act), it was loath to tinker with the underlying
constitutional dynamics of trademark law. At the USTA Annual
Meeting in 1950, the Lawyers' Advisory Committee of the USTA
unanimously opposed the amendment, asserting that its only
supporter was Paul Struven.436  At the same meeting, a
"legislative update" was given and critically noted that "[to
empower Congress to regulate the use and ownership of marks
might well, in effect, result in compulsory federal trade-mark
430 See generally Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of
Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 561-75 (2006) (discussing the
evolution of property and use theories of trademark law).
431 H.R.J. Res. 229, 81st Cong. (1949).
432 Letter from Rep. Eugene J. Keogh, to George Link Jr., Esq. (May 12, 1949)
(on file with author).
'3 G. A. Nichols, Inside Washington, PRINTER'S INK, May 13, 1949, at 15, 16.
4 Letter from Rep. Eugene J. Keogh to Daphne Robert, The Coca-Cola Co. (May
18, 1949) (on file with author).
" Currently the International Trademark Association. See INTA, History,
http'//www.inta.orgindex.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=26&Itemid= 122
&getcontent=4 (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
43 Report of the President, 40 TRADE-MARK REP. 483, 485 (presented at the
USTA annual meeting on June 6, 1950) ("Its only support has come from a so-called
trade-mark specialist who in prior years has supported compulsory state trade-mark
registration bills.").
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registration."437 On July 7, 1950, a meeting was held between
Rep. Keogh and the president and secretary of the organization,
along with other interested parties.43  Apparently, the
association and the congressman were not able to reach an
agreement, and the association continued to oppose the
amendment. The American Bar Association ("ABA") also
opposed the amendment in a resolution agreed to by the House of
Delegates at its annual meeting.3 9 The reasons given were that
the amendment was unnecessary and would have the negative
effect of destroying the common law of trademarks.44 ° As House
Resolution 229 had failed to progress in the Eighty-first
Congress, it was reintroduced as House Resolution 27 near the
beginning of the Eigthy-second Congress. 441 Aside from another
expression of disapproval by the ABA, however, not much was
done with it. 442
On October 28th 1953, the matter was revived when Mr.
Struven notified Rep. Keogh that an ally of the amendment, Mr.
I. Walton Bader, had been appointed to the ABA Committee on
Trademarks and would push for the amendment."4 3  Nothing
happened in the ABA due to general lack of interest and fears
that some trademark owners would be disadvantaged, 444 but the
letter does seem to have pushed Rep. Keogh to reintroduce the
amendment as House Resolution 331 near the beginning of the
437 Sylvester J. Liddy, Legislative Update, 40 TRADE-MARK REP. 644, 647
(presented at the USTA Annual Meeting June 6, 1950).
431 Present were: Henry B. King, Secretary of the U.S. Trademark Association;
Mr. Kenneth Perry, Vice President of Johnson & Johnson and President of the
USTA; Mr. Kenneth Bonham, President of the Emerson Drug Company; and Mr.
Sylvester J. Liddy. Letter from Henry B. King, Secretary, USTA to Rep. Eugene J.
Keogh (June 30, 1950); Letter from Rep. Eugene J. Keogh to Henry B. King,
Secretary, U.S. Trademark Assoc. (July 7, 1950).
4-" See Letter from Joseph D. Stecher, ABA Secretary, to Rep. Emanuel Celler,
House Judiciary Comm. Chairman (Mar. 21, 1950). The letter indicates that the
meeting where the resolution was passed was held from February 27 through 28,
1950. Id.
440 Id.
41 H.R.J. Res. 27, 82d Cong. (1951).
442 See George Von Gehr, Report of the Committee on Trade-Marks, 1951 A.B.A.
SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 40 (1951).
"I Letter from Mr. Paul Struven to Rep. Eugene J. Keogh (Oct. 28, 1953).
Telephone Interview with Mr. I. Walton Bader, Esq. (Oct. 25, 2006). More
specifically, the concern was that certain businesses that had long used a mark but
had never registered it would be disadvantaged by such an amendment. Id.
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second session of the Eighty-third Congress. 445 Once again, his
stated purpose was to "make uniform and clear the legislative
control of the Congress over trademarks generally."4 6  Once
again, not much happened with the amendment in committee,
although it did generate some opposition from the Bar.447
In late 1954, Mr. Struven sent Rep. Keogh a longer
memorandum than before, once again making the case for a
constitutional amendment.84 The memo was also more pointed
than before, focusing on the point that current trademark law
under the Lanham Act gave the mark's user only the right to
registration and not the right to title ownership or use of the
mark.449 It also made clear the necessity of directly overruling
the Trade-Mark Cases and that this was a major purpose of the
amendment. 450  Noting that it had been forty years since the
previous proposed amendments (1913), the memo forcefully
argued for title ownership for trademarks.451  Rep. Keogh
thereafter noted that he would be happy to continue this subject
in the next Congress,452 and after that year's election had been
won, Rep. Keogh checked with Mr. Struven to make sure the text
of the amendment was adequate. 4 That same day, Rep. Keogh
notified former congressman Fritz Lanham of Lanham Act fame
of his intent to introduce the bill and asked for comments-the
question of the amendment's viability would finally be raised in
earnest.
454
445 H.R.J. Res. 331 83d Cong. (1954). Though, even before this, Rep. Keogh
"probably" planned on reintroducing the amendment. Memorandum from Rep.
Eugene J. Keogh to Agnes Mathisen, Sec'y (Oct. 13, 1953).
"I Letter from Rep. Eugene J. Keogh to Mr. H. Hume Matthews, Chairman,
Legislative Committee, N.J. Patent Law Assoc. (Feb. 19, 1954) (on file with author).
47 See Letter from Comm. on Trade-Marks and Copyrights of the State Bar of
Tex. to the House Judiciary Comm. (May 12, 1954) (on file with author).
448 Memorandum, Trade-Mark Amendment to United States Constitution
Needed, from Paul Struven (undated), enclosed with Letter from Paul Struven to
Rep. Eugene J. Keogh (Sept. 15, 1954) (on file with author).
44' Id. at 1.
450 Id. at 2.
451 Id. at 3-4.
452 Letter from Rep. Eugene J. Keogh to Mr. Paul Struven (Oct. 7, 1954). The
letter also thanked Mr. Struven for his efforts on his behalf in the electoral
campaign that year. Id.
453 Letter from Rep. Eugene J. Keogh to Mr. Paul Struven (Dec. 29, 1954).
454 Letter from Rep. Eugene J. Keogh to Mr. Fritz Lanham (Dec. 29, 1954) (on
file with author).
2009]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The amendment was introduced on the first day of the
Eighty-fourth Congress as House Joint Resolution 3.455 It was
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary."' Shortly
thereafter, Rep. Keogh asked the Chair of the Committee to
request reports from the appropriate executive departments.457
Roughly one month later, Rep. Celler assigned the bill to a
subcommittee458 and requested the reports.459
While the subcommittee went about its business, the USTA
came out against the amendment. 6 ° In a resolution unanimously
adopted by its executive committee, it condemned the
amendment "as being contrary to the long-established principle
of common law that rights in marks are acquired by use and not
by registration or grant. To empower Congress to regulate the
use and ownership of marks will, in our opinion result in
Compulsory Federal Trademark Registration."461 This, of course,
was exactly what the amendment was meant to do. Whatever
the case, it is likely that the fact of this opposition's existence
was likely at least as important as the substance of the objection,
and local bar associations joined in opposing the amendment.462
Roughly one year after this, the reports from the executive
departments came back, and they were uniformly negative. The
Department of State was the most mild, in large part because it
limited itself to its purview of foreign policy and determined that
existing constitutional provisions were adequate for reciprocal
trademark treaties.463  The Department of Commerce, by
contrast, directly recommended against passage of the
amendment, noting that trademark law since 1881 had been
45 H.R.J. Res. 3, 84th Cong. (1955).
456 Letter from Rep. Eugene G. Keogh to Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman,
Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 10, 1955) (on file with author).
457 Id.
458 Letter from Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, to Rep.
Eugene J. Keogh (Feb. 4, 1955) (on file with author).
4'9 Letter from Rep. Eugene J. Keogh to Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Comm.
on the Judiciary (Jan. 10, 1955) (on file with author).
460 Letter from Sherwood E. Silliman, President, USTA to Rep. Eugene J. Keogh
(Mar. 7, 1955) (on file with author).
461 Id.
11 Letter from the Thomas F. McWilliams, Sec'y of the Patent Law Ass'n of Chi.,
to the Hon. Chairman of the Comm. on the Judiciary (May 3, 1955) (on file with
author).
463 Letter from Robert C. Hill, Assistant Sec'y of State to Emanuel Celler,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, Report of the Dep't of State on H.J. Res. 3 (Apr.
26, 1956) (on file with author).
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based on the Commerce Clause and was adequate.464 As such,
the amendment was unnecessary, and more than that, would be
harmful since it would imply that Congress had been without
authority up until this point to pass trademark laws and would
be antithetical to the notions of common law and federalism
central to American law.465 The Department of Justice similarly
questioned the necessity of the amendment but also noted that
this amendment would lead to concerns about anticompetitive
behavior.4 66  Noting that the Lanham Act included explicit
protections against anticompetitive uses of trademarks, the
Department of Justice explained that "[t]o accord trade-marks
the same constitutional sanction presently given to patents and
copyrights, might create an environment even more susceptible
to restraint of trade and injury to the public as a whole."467 In
the face of uniform opposition, the amendment died. Rep. Keogh
never introduced the amendment again, nor has anyone else
introduced a similar amendment to the United States
Constitution since.
In truth, the driving rationale for a constitutional
amendment had died out long before the last amendment failed.
By 1905, the Commerce Clause was seen as broad enough to
allow for domestic trademark regulation, and the reach of the
Commerce Clause would continue to expand. The law still
needed to require use in interstate commerce, but that became an
incredibly broad mandate. It is not difficult to imagine that
without this shift in our understanding of the Constitution, an
amendment would have been required to give the Lanham Act
the desired force.
V. IN SEARCH OF THE TRADE-MARK CASES
In taking the full measure of the Trade-Mark Cases, the
language of the holding regarding the Commerce Clause is
deceiving. The decision's cramped view of the Commerce Clause
' Letter from Sinclair Weeks, Sec'y of Commerce to Emaunel Celler,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, Report of the Sec'y of Commerce on H.J. Res. 3
(Apr. 25, 1956). As discussed, this is not quite accurate. See supra text
accompanying notes 423-430.
6 See id.
' Letter from William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney Gen. to Emanuel Cellar,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, Report of the Dep't of Justice on H.J. Res. 3
(May 15, 1956).
467 Id.
20091
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
is a "a quaint anachronism" 468 in the wake of Wickard v.
Filburn4 69 and its many cousins, leading all the way to Gonzalez
v. Raich,47' but to read any broad Commerce Clause holding into
the decision is to mistake the decision's copious dicta for a
holding. When one cuts away the dicta, one arrives at a simple
holding-a statute that relies on the Commerce Clause must
explicitly limit itself to Congress's powers under that clause.47 1
This principle has been recognized by the Supreme Court in the
last decade of the twentieth century472 and the first decade of the
twenty-first,473 and indeed, is built into the Lanham Act's explicit
requirement that trademarks be used in interstate commerce to
fall within its ambit. While the case may have embodied a more
cramped view of the Commerce Clause in its dicta which led
Congress to adopt a similarly constrained view, the Court
explicitly refused to decide the question of whether such
legislation could be permitted under the Commerce Clause
within the proper limitation of interstate commerce. 4
Regarding the treaty power, the Court explicitly resisted the
urge to comment on the power. In turn, Congress was forced to
wrestle with the issue that while it could not find the power to
enact legislation to execute treaties in the Constitution's text,
such a power needed to exist in order to carry out the power to
make treaties. The House Committee on the Judiciary wrestled
with this problem and came to a determination that produced no
46' Cross, supra note 1, at 373.
469 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
470 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2003).
471 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97-99 (1879).
471 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995), superseded by statute,
Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332, § 320904, as
stated in United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135 (6th Cir. 1996).
471 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000).
474 Professor Cross has argued that the decision of the Court in the Trade-Mark
Cases established a further important holding known as the "quaint anachronism"-
that congressional authority under the Commerce Clause regarding trademarks is
subject to the limitations of the Commerce Clause in that it only applies to
commerce among the several states. Cross, supra note 1, at 372-73. While the Court
did hold (really more state what it felt obvious) that this is the case, this very basic
holding remains good law, even if the Court in 1879 and the Court today might not
agree on the details of what "commerce among the several states" means. There is no
question that the clause works some limitation in theory, even if there is no actual
limitation due to the breadth of some definitions of "commerce among the several
states." Any language beyond that saying that commerce between two citizens of the
same state does not qualify as interstate commerce is dicta, as it is not relevant to
the Court's holding. Id.
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objection from any quarter. For purposes of the treaty power, the
true adjudication would be in Congress, and in that inquiry, the
treaty power began to take on powers it had never assumed
before, leading to Missouri v. Holland475 and its progeny one
generation later and to the modern era of the treaty power.
Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Court did not pull any
punches regarding the Intellectual Property Clause, issuing a
sweeping decision that dramatically narrowed the scope of this
Clause. It is hard to argue with Professor Cross's critique that
the Court's requirement of creativity has no basis in the text of
the Intellectual Property Clause.476 And yet, looking back on the
Trade-Mark Cases, the holding that a trademark cannot fall
within the coverage of the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution was entirely uncontroversial at the time. It does
not seem that anyone took the argument under the Intellectual
Property Clause seriously, and the Attorney General of the
United States was embarrassed to even present it to the
Supreme Court.
That the Court enshrined this popular understanding of the
Intellectual Property Clause into its jurisprudence is the greatest
legacy of the decision. Unlike the Commerce Clause, which has
been frequently ruled on and whose meaning has been
completely changed in the twentieth century, the Intellectual
Property Clause was barely commented on by the courts for
nearly one hundred years after the decision in the Trade-Mark
Cases. As a result, when the issue would begin to rear its head
again in this new age of the information economy, the courts
were faced with only one venerable decision squarely on point,
whose holding was highly favorable to a more liberal intellectual
property regime. In recent years, the Trade-Mark Cases have
come before the Supreme Court several times, most notably in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.477 In that
case, and countless others in the lower courts, the precedent of
the Supreme Court from 1879 continues to limit the extent of
patent and (especially) copyright claims over a wide variety of
subject matters, which does not meet the additional
constitutional requirements set forth by the Trade-Mark Cases.
475 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
476 Cross, supra note 1, at 383.
477 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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The opinions in Leidersdorf and then the Trade-Mark Cases
also helped motivate the nascent American trademark
community to mobilize and organize in support of its interests.
Prior to the decision in Leidersdorf, there existed no organization
to advocate for the rights of American trademark holders.
Slightly over one week after the decision in Leidersdorf, the
USTA met for the first time, and its advocacy helped shape the
1881 Trademark law.478 The USTA is now the International
Trademark Association, and over 125 years since its founding, it
remains the preeminent advocate for the rights of trademark
holders.
What one finds in searching the Trade-Mark Cases is
Congress and the courts wrestling with the confines of three
powers, none of which fit neatly into the issues brought on by the
advance of technology. Trademarks, of course, were nothing new,
but their wide use in a world being connected by steamers,
railroads, and the telegraph was. None of these powers were
quite the same after 1881, but perhaps the most changed was the
power the Court refused to address-the treaty power. When the
Supreme Court expressed the popular wisdom regarding the
Intellectual Property Clause but elided the Commerce Clause,
Congress developed the treaty power into a much more powerful
instrument by using it as the basis of a commercial act, which
would bind domestic and foreign parties alike. In the
development of these now-antiquated statutes, we find the law
marching ahead and becoming its modern self.
478 L. E. Daniels, supra note 411.
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